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INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS OF A
CONVENTIONAL APPROACH

;The purpose of this article is to promote a particular research program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract
formation. Although I will often simply speak of offer and acceptance
in my discussion, I mean to refer to a broader set of issues than are
commonly denoted by this doctrinal label. My program transcends
the narrow issue of whether particular communications technically
should be classified as offers and acceptances, and includes questions
often analyzed under the rubrics of implication and interpretation. At
its broadest, my argument addresses all legal rules that answer two
types of questions: First, which objectively verifiable actions or subjectively experienced intentions suffice to conclude a bargain and form a
contractual obligation? Second, how do these actions and intentions
affect the substantive content of any contract formed?
The legal doctrines governing these questions present some of the
more subtle and technical problems in all of the law. Their metaphysical controversies and mechanical intricacies have puzzled countless
lawyers and judges and have consigned generations of law students to
torment at the hands of their professors. Yet the law of offer and acceptance has generated relatively little interest in the literature that
addresses contract law from a policy perspective. Instead, commentators concerned with public policy have focused largely on the consequences of contracts after formation.
In particular, there has been little formal analysis of the rules of
contract formation and interpretation in the law and economics literature, except in a narrow, limited sense. 1 Legal scholars influenced by
economics have generated a substantial literature on contract reme1. There are a few recent and laudable exceptions, most prominently Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989). An alternative approach is provided by Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, A Bargaining
Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. &
Pus. POLY. 639 (1989), who examine the law of bargaining from the perspective of cooperative
game theory. As I explain in Part Ill, I consider the noncooperative game-theoretic approach of
the former authors more useful, since the cooperative approach, while illuminating, is not well
grounded in the theory of individual rational choice.
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dies,2 on excuse for mistake, impossibility, and frustration of purpose, 3
and on private enforcement of contracts,4 among other topics. But
these scholars nonetheless have been primarily concerned with predicting the consequences of substantive contract terms of various
sorts, and with identifying the optimal content of these terms.
These writers, for the most part, have addressed formation and interpretation only in arguing that the particular substantive terms that
they have identified as optimal should as a general practice be implied,
either in fact or in law, by courts enforcing contracts. This type of
interpretive claim is widespread in the policy literature. A common
version of it holds that because it is too costly for contracting parties
explicitly to provide for every possible aspect of their bargain, courts
can promote efficiency, fairness, or other socially desirable objectives
by implying the optimal terms when the parties fail expressly to provide otherwise. A variation on this theme, while recognizing that optimal substantive terms may vary depending on the contracting parties'
individual circumstances, asserts that a default rule that implies terms
optimal for typically situated parties will best promote the desired social goal. Additionally, some claim an optimally chosen default rule
will minimize the total costs incurred by those who wish to negotiate
around the implied term.
While these sorts of arguments have intuitive appeal in many settings, the premises necessary for their validity remain unexamined. In
order to assess how parties will react to rules of presumptive interpretation, it is necessary to consider the parties' individual incentives to
engage in negotiation under various possible interpretative regimes.
And those who argue in favor of default rules and presumptive terms
have rarely investigated the parties' incentives to bargain with anywhere near the detail or rigor that they have explored the parties'
wishes regarding the particular substantive term under consideration.
2. The literature is too extensive to cite here in full. Prominent articles include Cooter &
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1434 (1985); Craswen, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988); Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach ofContract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983); Shaven,
The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 121 (1984); Shaven, Damage
Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 466 (1980); and Ulen, The Efficiency of
Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. R.Ev. 341
(1984).
3. See, e.g., Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge
Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1988).
4. See, e.g., Klein & Leffier, The Role ofMarket Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,
89 J. POL. EcoN. 615 (1981); Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L.
& EcoN. 691 (1983); Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980); Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 519
(1983).
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Accordingly, the mechanical rules of contract formation so beloved to hombook authors and bar examiners, and the related body of
legal doctrine that helps imply the content of the contract from the
history of the bargaining, largely have escaped attention from those
legal scholars influenced by economics. 5 The preponderance of the
literature treats such rules as largely conventional, and accordingly
irrelevant for purposes of policy analysis. Instead, the prevailing if
implicit paradigm is well captured by the homily that it is more important for the law to be settled than to be settled correctly.
Under this view, which might be called the conventional wisdom
in both a popular and a substantive sense, it is obviously necessary that
there exist rules and that they be generally observed, but their specific
contents are not of independent theoretical interest. Rather, the law of
offer and acceptance serves primarily a coordinating function, in much
the same way that traffic ordinances do. And while we need rules to
tell motorists on which side of the road to drive, it may not matter
whether motorists are to be instructed to keep left or to keep right, so
long as they are all instructed similarly.
The conventional wisdom's neglect of the law of bargaining is especially noteworthy given the critical importance of bargaining to the
economic analysis of law. A chief message of law and economics, if
not the chief message, is that the effect of legal rules cannot be understood properly without taking account of the incentive for private
transactions. This message is most strikingly embodied in the wellknown "Coase theorem," which in its strongest version claims that so
long as the mechanisms of private ordering are frictionless, legal rules
will have no effect on the allocation of resources. 6 One might have
expected, therefore, that the set of legal rules that regulate private or5. One can identify, of course, exceptions to this generalization. The most prominent of
these is the discussion of duties of disclosure in bargaining initiated by Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978). Kronman, who
bases his analysis on the insights that private information can be socially valuable, costly to
obtain, and deliberately acquired in view of its monetary return, argues that n rule entitling
persons to conceal deliberately acquired information will best promote the socially efficient
amount of informational investment. Since Kronman does not seriously attempt to combine his
useful insights with an account of bargaining, however, his conclusion is open to question. For
critiques of his argument, see Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, supra note 1at692-707, and Ayres
& Gertner, supra note 1. Another prominent exception is Baird and Weisberg's analysis of the
"battle of the forms,'' which I discuss in Part VI. See Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and
the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982).
6. The Coase theorem is generally agreed to have first found expression in arguments made
in Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 25 (1959), and Conse,
The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960), though Coase never stated the theorem as
such in print and himself attributes its precise formulation to George Stigler. See R. CoASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157-58 (1988).
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dering and determine its frictions would have occupied a more prominent place on the research agenda of law and economics.
It would be surprising in light of current theoretical understandings of bargaining, moreover, if contract formation and interpretation
rules served merely a coordinating role. Most formal economic accounts of bargaining conclude that when information is imperfect or
communication costly, self-interested parties generally will fail to realize the full potential surplus from exchange. Just how much is wasted
will depend on the precise structure of the institutions that govern the
bargaining.7 Different legal rules, once established, imply different institutional structures for contracting parties and may induce different
forms of bargaining behavior. Hence they can have important consequences for the efficiency of exchange.
If, as the Coasian world view suggests, the consequences of all
legal rules turn on the outcome of private barg~g, it is unclear why
economically influenced lawyers have failed to give priority to studying the law governing the bargaining process. While it is not really my
aim here to answer this question, I can offer some speculations. One
possibility is that the formal techniques economists use to model strategic behavior have been refined only recently and have so far been
inaccessible to lawyers. Furthermore, because these methods are relatively abstract and sometimes inconclusive, lawyers have been discouraged from trying to master them. 8 This answer is perhaps overly facile
given the wholesale use such tools have found in the study of corporate control; nonetheless, a major purpose of this article is to help
bring them to a wider audience.
A second explanation might lie in one particular strand of the Coasian tradition - the claim that impediments to bargaining are largely
insignificant in practice. In contrast to the Coase theorem, which purports to be an analytic statement, this claim is a contingent proposition
open to empirical challenge. Yet it retains popular influence among
devotees of the economic approach - enough for Coase himself to
take pains to disclaim any belief in its validity in a recent retrospective
essay.9 The Coase theorem's aesthetic power, combined with the rela7': See, e.g., Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem. 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. 113 (1987);
Myerson & Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. 29 J. EcoN. THEORY 265
(1983).
8. This may be rapidly changing, in light of the growing importance of game-theoretic methodology to applied microeconomics generally. The recent 1990 meeting of the AALS Section on
Law and Economics, for instance, was devoted to a discussion of applications of game theory.
See also Ayres, Playing Games with the Law (Book Review), 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291 (1990).
9. See R. CoASE, supra note 6, at 174:
The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing
could be further from the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I
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tively sanguine view of private ordering that infuses much law-andeconomics scholarship, may have directed attention away from part of
Coase's message, and away from the details of private negotiation.
But the broadest reason for law-and-economics scholars' neglect of
the rules of offer and acceptance may be that more traditional legal
commentators have ignored the subject as well, instead relying on the
conventional wisdom. Charles Fried's description is a fair representative in this regard:
Promises - and therefore contracts - are fundamentally relational; one
person must make the promise to another, and the second person must
accept it. Acceptance may be assured by any conventional device, such
as speaking the words "I accept" with the intention of referring to a
conventional device in which the words figure. There are wide latitude
and informality in what counts as an intention to accept a promise, just
as the promise itself can be made in many ways. 10

Now the conventional wisdom is not without its appeal, much of
which stems from the fact that it happens to describe reasonably well,
at least at the hombook level, current American legal doctrine in the
area. Because of the great diversity of settings in which individuals
may negotiate, black-letter statements in the area are typically phrased
in general language and anticipate a wide variety of possible social
practices. The Second Restatement's definitions of offer and acceptance are illustrative:
§ 24. Offer Defined. An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter
into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding
that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.
§ 50. Acceptance of Offer Defined.... (1) Acceptance of an offer is a
manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a
manner invited or required by the offer. 11

Beyond the necessarily general language of black-letter formulations, American contract law also allows contracting parties considerable leeway to choose the form of their agreement in practice. This is
especially so for contracts governed by Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code, which in large part reflects the view of Llewellyn and
his colleagues that commercial law should be grounded in the expectations of the community of traders. 12 Aside from its variety of specific
was hoping to persuade economists to leave. What I did in ''The Problem of Social Cost"
was simply to bring to light some of its properties.

10. C. FRIED, CoNTRACT AS PROMISE 4546 (1981).
11. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS §§ 24, 50 (1979).
12. This is a view, of course, with historical antecedents going back at least as far as Mans·
field. See generally Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975); Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987).
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provisions referring to trade usage, course of dealing, course of performance, good faith, and commercial reasonableness, Article II directs courts generally to defer to private usage in adjudicating
formation issues.13
At a more theoretical level, furthermore, scholarly discussion of
contract formation, motivated by the proverbial image of the "meeting
of the minds," has typically focused on the tension between objective
and subjective theories of mutual assent. This tension has underscored
the questions of how communication between two individuals takes
place and how the substance of that communication can be known to a
third party called upon to enforce the contract. Such questions lead
naturally to the philosophy of language; and so modem accounts of
offer and acceptance have tended to reflect the philosophical literature's emphasis on conventional understandings as an explanation of
meaning. 14 This emphasis has been sustained in more recent years by
theoretical accounts of contract law such as Fried's15 that, in concentrating on the basic question of why promises should be enforced, tend
to take as given the meaning of promissory language. 16
Other, broader currents in the history of contract law have helped
reinforce the conventional wisdom. At the height of its formal elaboration in the nineteenth century, as exemplified by cases like Adams v.
Lindself 11 and Dickinson v. Dodds, is the central concerns of the law of
offer and acceptance were whether and at what point a contract had
been formed. With the decline of laissez-faire ideology and of traditional formalism, and with the growing acceptance of promissory estoppel as a foundation for liability, these issues receded in
13. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204 (1989):
Formation in general. (1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient
to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract. (2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found
even though the moment ofits making is undetermined. (3) Even though one or more terms
are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
See also U.C.C. § 2-206 (1989) ("Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contracts. (1) Unless
otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an offer to make a
contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable
in the circumstances •...").
14. See generally Farnsworth, ''Meaning" in the Law of Contracts. 16 YALE L.J. 939 (1967);
Williams, Language and the Law (pt. 4), 61 L.Q. REV. 384 (1945).
15. See C. FRIED, supra note 10.
16. For an insightful critique on these grounds of promissory theories in general, see Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mice. L. REV. 489
(1989).
17. 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
18. 2 Ch. D. 463 (C.A. 1876).
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importance. 19 Instead, the content of contractual obligation came to
loom larger than its existence. This shift in emphasis was reinforced
by the increase in duration and complexity of commercial relationships associated with the development of the modem economy. 20
Whatever the origins of modem scholarly inattention to the rules
of offer and acceptance, however, it has meant the neglect of an important set of policy considerations. Economic policy issues do arise
under the conventional view; yet discourse is limited to a subset of
concerns that arise only in the course of administering the prevailing
understandings - what might be called convention maintenance.
These concerns include protecting the reliance interests of those who
operate according to established convention, mediating between those
using rival conventions, and providing incentives for newcomers to
learn established convention.21
While the maintenance of a given convention is obviously important for the particular parties who use it, none of the policy considerations thereby raised gives us any assistance in deciding what the ideal
convention should or could be in the long run. 22 In principle, one
cannot define a convention solely on the basis of reliance or expectations, simply because the reasonableness of reliance or expectation is
ordinarily judged in light of prevailing background understandings. 23
19. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OP CoNTRAcr (1974); cf. Comment, Once More
into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Damage Doctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 559,
574 (1970):
Most important [for· private autonomy] iS the fact that the point at which the bargain is
struck is usually mutually identifiable to the parties. They themselves are aware of the ex·
tent to which they may act in their own interests, and of the point at which their conduct
bas led to a binding obligation. The requirement of consideration thus operates to delineate
an identifiable sphere of precontractual conduct free of legal restraint.
20. See generally Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts. 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
21. Such considerations are raised by cases like Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.
1948), and Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), where individu·
als seeking franchise or dealership contracts sunk substantial reliance investments in the course
of preliminary negotiations, and by Frigaliment Importing v. B.N.S. Intl. Sales, 190 F. Supp. 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), in which one of Judge Henry Friendly's classic commercial opinions grew out
of a valiant attempt to mediate between two poultry dealers disputing the meaning of the word
"chicken." One reason the preliminary negotiation cases are widely cited and studied is that they
illustrate the tension between the commercial conventions used by ordinary business persons and
the formal legalistic conventions expressed in traditional black-letter law, as well as the tension
between the individualistic convention of hard bargaining practiced by the franchisors and the
more altruistic, relational conventions supposedly favored by small business JY..TSOns. The Fri·
galiment case, where either one side relied on trade ~ge and the other on general usage, or
where each relied on different trade usages, presents an analogous problem.
22. Except, of course, that a convention with lower maintenance costs, perhaps due to its
simplicity, would thereby have an advantage over one with higher maintenance costs, other
things being equal.
23. Theories that ground legal doctrine in the historical tradition or custom of a particular
society may escape circularity, but exclude the possibility that tradition can be improved on.
Moreover, the dictates of tradition may not always be clear-cut.
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Any particular convention that happened to be accepted widely would
involve efficiency and distributional concerns of some sort in its
maintenance.
The long-run costs and benefits of a convention, however, also depend on how it affects individuals' behavior once established and accepted. To return to the traffic law analogy, having everyone keep to
the left side of the road might conceivably be a better policy than having everyone keep to the right. Differences in reaction times arising
from the fact that the majority of drivers are right-handed, for instance, or asymmetric features of local roads, might make one of the
two conventions superior ex ante. Where no convention yet exists, as
when a newly discovered technology or legal innovation allows a new
class of transactions, such considerations can usefully guide the development of legal doctrine.
Furthermore, even when conventions are well entrenched, the
long-run advantages of a superior convention might outweigh the
transitional disadvantages of switching conventions. With careful
planning these disadvantages can be minimized, and they are temporary. The costs of an inefficient or unfair convention, in contrast, are
made up in volume; they are paid each time a transaction occurs under
its auspices.
To recapitulate, for new categories of transactions, newly developed institutions, private associations, and well-run organizations able
to alter their standard procedures without unreasonable disruption, a
policy analysis of rival bargaining conventions may be of great practical importance. Even if it is not open to us to change existing conventions, moreover, studying their long-run consequences can help us
understand how they affect efficiency, private autonomy, and other social objectives. Such an understanding may also help to evaluate other
arguments that presuppose some form of private ordering as a background condition; most notably the Coase theorem.
In this article, I hope to pe~uade the reader of two propositions:
first, that the rules of contract formation and interpretation are fundamental to understanding the outcome and efficiency of bargaining
transactions; and second, that bargaining rules and institutions are
best understood by a detailed inquiry into their strategic structure. By
this I mean that one must carefully specify the possible choices available to parties engaged in negotiation, the temporal sequence in which
the choices occur, the costs and benefits to each party for each possible
sequence of actions, and the information available at each step. Only
then is it possible to predict how rational or imperfectly rational indi-
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viduals will behave under a given bargaining regime. 24 I contend that
the strategic structure of offer and acceptance determines the long-run
characteristics of private ordering.
Before illustrating these claims with regard to specific legal rules,
however, some general background is necessary. Accordingly, Part II
of this paper outlines the central role of the bargaining problem in the
law and economics literature. Part III provides a necessarily incomplete survey of the economics of bargaining, and its main concepts and
techniques. Part IV discusses a number of qualifications to the analysis, and sets forth the main limitations of the game-theoretic approach
and the problems raised in applying it to contract bargaining.
The succeeding two Parts are the heart of the article: they apply
the method to two particular doctrinal areas. Part V uses a simple
model of bargaining to analyze the doctrine of acceptance by silence,
and Part VI presents a model of contract negotiation in the form-contract setting and analyzes the common law duty to read. Finally, Part
VII comments on the implications of the specific models for future
analysis.
One caveat is appropriate, however. I do not mean to suggest that
legal rules are the only important determinants of the outcome of bargaining. In many settings, social norms and ethical precepts provide
well-defined and successful ways to divide the surplus from exchange
and to reduce the social costs of strategic behavior.25 Particular methods of dividing the gains from trade, such as a fifty-fifty split or choosing a round number, may be aesthetically appealing or may offer focal
points to which the parties are drawn. Furthermore, the desire to
maintain goodwill or an ongoing relationship will encourage cooperation, since an individual acquiring a reputation for contentiousness
may find it difficult to attract future contract partners. All these factors would be important elements in a complete account of negotiation. Nevertheless, when social sanctions are insufficient to achieve
full cooperation, as they often are in reality, the legal rules of bargaining play an important role. Indeed, legal rules that discourage cooperation make it more difficult for nonlegal institutions to perform their
facilitative roles in exchange. 26 Accordingly, I focus here only on the
24. While I am by .no means committed to rational-choice models as the only plausible description of human behavior, I do view the assumption of rationality as the most useful starting
point for a research strategy for studying strategic interaction. On this question, see infra Part
IV.
25. See, e.g., Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
26. For one thing, settlements reached by private actors will typically be influenced by their
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role of legal rules and institutions.
II. THE

BARGAINING PROBLEM IN LAW AND EcONOMICS

While a few hard-core loyalists may maintain that the premises of
the Coase theorem generally are satisfied in actual practice, most
scholars regard the claim that private ordering is frictionless as trivializing the problem of cooperation. Instead, Coase's real influence was
in focusing attention on impediments to exchange which arise in particular institutional settings. Such impediments are typically grouped
under the general rubric of "transaction costs" - a term embracing a
variety of technological and informational factors that differ widely in
origin and explanation. In the broader Coasian view, the regulatory
consequences of law can be understood only by focusing on transaction costs and on the institutional structure generating them. 27
The generality of the transaction cost concept and the looseness
with which the term has been used in the law-and-economics literature, however, have obscured Coase's lesson. Consequently, some
have disparaged his theorem as a tautology, 28 as indeed it would be if
transaction costs were defined as anything preventing a mutually benefi.cial bargain. The considerations commonly included under the
transaction-cost label can more usefully be divided into two groups:
costs of implementation and costs of strategic behavior. 29 Implementation costs are the real resources used up in bringing contracting parties
together, in executing and administering the resulting agreement, in
enforcing any bargain reached, and in settling any disputes that arise
along the way. These costs include the expense of communication
among the parties, of acquiring information about the value of the relevant costs and benefits, of drafting and executing any writing, of
transporting any physical objects at issue, of making and collecting
payments, of detecting any violations of the bargain, and of conducting any necessary renegotiations.
Since implementation costs are measured in resources, they are diviews of how legal authorities would resolve the situation should other institutions fail in the
task. See, e.g., H. Ross, SETILED OUT OF CoURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS (1970); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Demsetz, When Does the Rule ofLiability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972)
(discussing tort and property); Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233-61 (1979) (discussing contract).
28. See, e.g., Calabresi, Transaction Costs. Resource Allocation and Liability Rules -A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67, 68 (1968).
29. The distinction is due to Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982), though
he does not use these particular terms. This Part of the article owes a great deal to Cooter's
analysis.
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rectly comparable to the potential surplus from an agreement, and if
they exceed that surplus no exchange can profitably occur. To illustrate, a Chevrolet dealer in Chicago may be willing to sell me a car for
less than the maximum I am willing to pay, which is itself bounded by
the price of similar cars in Ann Arbor where I live. If the difference
between my price and the dealer's is not very large, however, it will
not be worth my while to learn the dealer's price, get myself to Chicago via some other means of transportation, and drive the car back.
Still, I can better justify this trouble for the savings on a car than for
the savings on a minor purchase like a box of breakfast cereal.
Strategic behavior costs, in contrast, are the losses suffered because
bargainers have the incentive to maximize their individual gains rather
than the total surplus from exchange. Since the potential surplus can
be divided among the parties in various ways, the parties may invest
real resources in hopes of altering the division. Or, they may act in
ways that either destroy a portion of the surplus or that risk that the
bargain will fall through. Such actions may include selling or buying a
lesser quantity than one really wants in order to get a better price (like
the canonical monopolist), misrepresenting or withholding information about cost or value, making bluffs (and perhaps carrying them out
for the sake of credibility), or extended haggling, which both takes up
valuable time and delays the enjoyment of the bargain. For example,
even once I reach the point of negotiating with the Chevrolet dealer, I
may understate the price I am willing to pay, and the dealer may overstate the price at which she is willing to sell. This behavior is wasteful
because it takes actual time and because the dealer and I, by concealing information, may fail to discover that a mutually beneficial bargain
exists.
The two types of transaction costs I have identified can be distinguished on a number of functional grounds. For one, the normative
terms in which each is evaluated are markedly different. The loss of
an exchange due to implementation costs is not ordinarily described as
inefficient, unless those costs are wastefully high. For instance, if the
cost of shipping my Chevrolet from Chicago exceeds the difference
between my price and the dealer's, then the exchange is not worth
performing. While both the dealer and I might wish that shipping
costs were lower, we would not regret the lost deal ex post. In contrast, if we miss an exchange by concealing information, we subsequently may wish we had acted differently, and many would view the
outcome as inefficient. Jo
30. More accurately, the appropriate definition of efficiency may be controversial when not
all information is shared, as is observed by Holmstrom & Myerson, Efficient and Durable Deci-
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More important from a methodological standpoint, however, implementation costs are substantially more straightforwardly and well
defined; they are the concrete costs of undertaking specific activities
and are in principle directly measurable. In contrast, while strategic
behavior costs can result in resource expenditure, they may in some
circumstances be measurable only by lost potential surplus - that is,
by the absence of a bargain. Criticisms of the Coase theorem as tautological, accordingly, are better directed at strategic behavior than implementation costs. Any practical account of strategic costs will
require some theory of bargaining - one that predicts under what
circumstances bargainers will be able to reach a cooperative outcome. 31 Much of the law-and-economics literature, accordingly, has
concerned itself implicitly with how legal rules set the framework for
bargaining.
A.

The Relation Between Substantive Legal Rules and Bargaining

Many prominent contributions to the economic analysis of law
suggest how substantive entitlements affect strategic behavior. Calabresi and Melamed's distinction between liability and property rules
provides the classic illustration.32 They observed that a particular
legal entitlement such as the right to undisturbed enjoyment of a given
parcel of land can be protected in at least two ways. If the entitlement
is protected only by a liability rule, anyone has the legal power, if not
the right, to violate it provided they pay damages in compensation. In
contrast, when an entitlement is protected by a property rule, no one
has the power to violate it without first obtaining the permission of the
holder. Such a rule might be enforced by criminal or equitable sanctions, effectively requiring that permission to make use of the entitlement be obtained in a voluntary exchange.
As Calabresi and Melamed argued, the choice among these alternatives (and a third- making the entitlement inalienable) both influences and depends on private bargaining. The different rules alter the
threats and offers available to the parties. Under a liability rule, the
potential infringer has the power to cut short the bargaining and force
sion Rules with Incomplete Information, 51 EcoNOMETRICA 1799 (1983). That the dealer and I
regret the outcome of our haggling is not the same as saying we view our original actions as
incorrect given our positions at the time we took them. The decision to be a tough bargainer may
be sensible when one does not know the opponent's reservation price, but the failure of the
negotiation conveys new information initially not available.
31. Regan's well-known critique of the Coase theorem literature makes just this point. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 427 (1972); see also Cooter, supra
note 29.
32. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
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the question of the valuation of the entitlement before some public
authority. Under a property rule, the entitlement holder has the
power to end the bargaining without an exchange taking place. These
possibilities may alter the outcome of any negotiation that occurs.
Other determinants of bargaining can influence the relative efficiency
or fairness of the alternative rules. For instance, if the institutional
authority charged with enforcing an entitlement has relatively poor
information about the social costs and benefits of an infringement, a
liability rule may be relatively inefficient. In such a situation it might
be better to decentralize the allocative decision via a property rule,
which allows the parties to establish the value of the entitlement by
private agreement.33
Parallel arguments can be found in the economic analyses of virtually every field of the law. Much of the debate over the economics of
contract remedies, for instance, turns on the commentators' differing
views of e?C post renegotiation. Whether specific performance is more
effective than money damages in promoting the efficient level of contract breach can depend upon the strategic behavior costs it induces. 34
One's view of the merits of the standard alternatives to measuring
money damages - expectation, reliance, and restitution - will similarly be affected by one's view of bargaining. Since the efficiency of the
various measures depends on the relative importance of encouraging
efficient breach, reliance, or risk allocation, 35 by affecting the relative
significance of these factors ex post renegotiation can alter the ranking
of the various measures.36
Within law and economics more generally, one's account of strategic behavior costs will typically determine one's basic normative
stance. If one posits that the parties usually will find it in their interest
to cooperate, one is led to what Cooter and Ulen have called the "normative Coase theorem": that the law should be structured to mini33. See id.
34. Compare, e.g., Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979)
(arguing that specific performance, by eliminating large liquidated damages payouts, would minimize gains of strategic behavior) with Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351
(1978) (specific performance will raise cost of accepting potentially efficient alternative offers).
Ulen, supra note 2, attempts to reconcile the two arguments. A recent technical game-theoretic
analysis of the issue can be found in Lewis, Perry & Sappington, Renegotiation and Specific
Performance, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Winter 1989, at 33.
35. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 2; Shavell, supra note 2; Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and
Damage Measures far Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 39 (1984).
36. See Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory ofEfficient Breach, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 629 (1988), and Craswell, supra note 2 (arguing on this logic that the importance
of efficient breach has been overrated and damage rules should be designed to promote efficiency
in risk allocation and in deciding whether to enter into contracts ex ante).
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mize the impediments to private bargaining.37 Given the hypothesis of
cooperation, these impediments will be, in my terminology, primarily
implementation costs; this suggests a relatively libertarian path for the
law. In this view, infringements on the freedom of contract for some
should be tolerated only to lessen transaction costs for a larger number
of others. 38
On the other hand, if noncooperation is the rule, the social harm
that would arise from the prescriptions of the normative Coase theo- .
rem could be great. Cooter, in an incisive critique of the Coasian literature, reminds readers of the very different account of self-interested
behavior provided by Hobbes' Leviathan, and wryly suggests a "Hobbes theorem" as counterweight to the Coase theorem: since untrammeled selfishness will inevitably lead to a war of all against all in which
life will be nasty, brutish, and short, legal rules should be designed to
minimize the cost incurred when cooperation fails. 3 9
To determine whether a Coasian or Hobbesian approach is the better practical guide, we need to specify more carefully the bargaining
likely to take place. For example, even from a Hobbesian viewpoint,
one need not advocate minimizing the cost of a bargaining breakdown
in the individual case, since the cost of a breakdown might influence
its likelihood. If the parties knew that the consequences of failing to
agree were very severe, they might act in a more cooperative fashion
than otherwise. 40 The net effect on the expected costs of strategic behavior would then depend upon whether the probability of agreement
increased more or less than proportionately to the loss from a breakdown.41 The result cannot be predicted without either a specific theo37. See generally Cooter, supra note 29; R. CooTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOMICS 99102 (1988). I suspect this is the primary difference, rather than partisan ideology or geographical
origins, separating the so-called "conservative" and "liberal" wings of law-and-economics
scholarship.
38. An application of this principle would be implying a particular term in a contract in
order to save the majority of contracting parties the expense of writing it in explicitly. The
presumption should be rebuttable, though; if particular individuals do not want the implied term
and are prepared to pay the implementation costs of eliminating it, it is efficient to allow them to
do so.
39. Cooter, supra note 29, at 18.
40. But see Crawford, A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining, 50 EcoNOMETRICA 607
(1982); Fudenberg & Tirole, Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information, 50 REV. EcoN.
STUD. 221 (1983) (formal models in which an increase in the potential surplus· from an agreement can lower the probability of a successful bargain).
41. Expected losses, of course, need not be the social minimand. If we as a society were more
concerned about a small risk of a relatively large loss than about a large risk of a relatively small
loss, we might want to follow Cooter's "Hobbes Theorem" and design legal rules that minimize
the chances of the former. An illustration of the tradeoff is found in debates over nuclear strategy: advocates of a strong nuclear deterrent stress that the threat of mutual assured destruction
reduces to nil the chances of a superpower conflict, while opponents highlight the risks should
something go wrong.
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retical account of, or reliable empirical evidence about, the bargaining
process.
B.

The Effect of Contract Formation Rules on Bargaining

This intellectual background makes it all the more surprising that
the law of contract formation has attracted only scant attention in the
law-and-economics literature. If the basic arguments of law and economics turn on the theory of bargaining, as I have argued, and if these
conclusions are in fundamental dispute, we should look to the law of
bargaining to help resolve the controversy. In this light, contract formation should be seen as logically prior to most if not all of the major
issues in law and economics.
Both kinds of transaction costs are affected in large part by rules of
contract formation and interpretation. For example, various rules prescribe the degree of thoroughness and formality required for a contract to be enforceable. Among these are the Statute of Frauds, the
definiteness doctrine (which demands that the parties specify the major terms of the agreement in requisite detail)42 and, in important respects, the doctrine of consideration.43
Such requirements directly affect the implementation costs of
agreement. To satisfy the Statute of Frauds, time and effort must be
expended to create an authoritative record of the agreement; papers
and perhaps the parties themselves must be transported back and forth
at substantial expense and delay. To satisfy the definiteness doctrine,
resources must be spent negotiating specific contract language at a
time where relevant information is still unknown.44
Perhaps less obviously, rules of offer and acceptance also influence
strategic behavior costs. Requiring additional negotiation before a
contract becomes enforceable, for instance, changes the information
available to the parties at various critical moments. Parties may acquire information about the other side's likely future behavior at the
42. The requirement of definiteness has relaxed in recent years, in part due to the influence of
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204(3), which provides that "a contract for sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy." U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1989). The U.C.C. also provides
various presumptive or "off-the-shelf" terms that will be implied to supplement an incomplete
agreement, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-308 (1989) (place of delivery), § 2-309 (1989) (time of delivery), and
§ 2-310 (1989) (time and place of payment).
43. See generally Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
44. The requirements could be cost-justified, of course, if they help reduce costs of later
administering and enforcing the contract. But see Huberman & Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation, 18 AM. EcoN. REV. 471 (1988) (where the enforcing
authority has imperfect information ex post, an efficient contract may be achievable only by
planning for and engaging in renegotiation).
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time reliance investments must be sunk. This infom!iation will introduce certain possibilities of influencing the adversary's actions and will
foreclose some others. For another example, rules requiring disclosure
of private information or penalizing nondisclosure may, by reducing
the cost of investigation and lowering the chance of error, improve the
efficiency of negotiation.4s
Many interesting theoretical questions in this area of the law cry
out for a more detailed analysis in this regard. The distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts, for example, has perplexed
generations of lawyers. When can a binding acceptance be accomplished by simply performing the actions requested by the promisor as
consideration, and when is it necessary for the promisee to provide a
counter-promise in order to accept?46 While the outcomes of actual
disputes turn on the distinction, the possible reasons why a promisor
would want to choose one over the other and the different bargaining
frameworks thereby implied are less than clear; and the efficiency consequences of a presumption in one direction or another remain an
open question.
The network of rules that govern the mechanics of contracts concluded by correspondence provides a second set of examples. Suppose
two individuals send each other identical offers that cross in the mail
and are received simultaneously. According to black-letter law no
contract is formed until one of the parties posts a responding acceptance. 47 Mechanical rules such as these commonly are justified on the
ground that they establish a benchmark around which parties can plan
their affairs; any more complexity would supposedly create confusion
during the bargaining. This justification would be more persuasive if
parties knew at the time of bargaining whether their communications
would ultimately be classified as offers, acceptances, or as some other
preliminary communication such as an invitation to make an offer. In
45. See generally the sources cited in supra note 1. But see Matthews & Postlewaite, Quality
Testing and Disclosure. 16 RAND J. EcoN. 328 (1985) (arguing that product information will
decrease under a regime of mandatory disclosure).
46. See R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 32 (1979) ("Invitation of Promise or
Performance"), § 45 (1979) ("Option Contract Created by Part Performance or Tender''), and
§ 62 (1979) ("Effect of Performance by Offeree Where Offer Invites Either Performance or Promise"); E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs § 3.12 (1982).
47. See R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 23, illustration 4 (1979). There is a
proliferation of complementary doctrines addressing variations on this problem. Suppose an attempt to revoke and an attempt to accept cross in the mail; the black-letter rule is that the
acceptance prevails, unless the original offer specified otherwise. Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Aid.
681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818); see also R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 63
(1979). Alternatively, suppose an offeree regrets an acceptance and wires a rejection that overtakes the accepting communication? According to black-letter law the acceptance is binding on
the offeree, but if the offeror relies on an apparent rejection, the offeree is estopped from enforcing the contract. See id., comment c and illustration 7.
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reality, however, actual communications generally are not labeled "offer" or "acceptance," and, even if they were, the label would not be
legally conclusive. On the other hand, which particular mechanical
rule is chosen will set the structure and sequence of bargaining, and
change the time at which parties can safely rely. The choice is by no
means neutral. 48
These examples illustrate the relevance of developing a practical
theory of contract bargaining, both to evaluate the rules of contract
formation in terms of their effect on the efficiency and fairness of exchange, and to evaluate other legal rules thaf set the substantive
framework for negotiation. In the remainder of this article, I explain
how I think this can and should be done.
Ill.

A SKETCHY SURVEY OF THE EcONOMICS OF BARGAINING

In this Part and the next I outline the basic features of the theoretical approach currently used by most economists to analyze bargaining.
The survey is necessarily incomplete; however, a basic familiarity with
the approach is a prerequisite for the specific discussions of Parts V
and VI. Readers conversant with the modem theory of incomplete
information games may skip directly to Part V without loss of
continuity.49
Take as an illustration an archetypical bargaining problem: that of
dividing a cake of fixed size and uniform quality between two parties.
Each would prefer more cake to less, but the cake will go to waste
unless they can agree on its division. One useful account of this problem has been described in the law-and-economics literature by Cooter,
48. A third example is furnished by the various doctrines governing renegotiation, as the
opportunity to modify a contract can substantially complicate both the bargaining framework
and the strategies the parties can adopt. This problem has recently attracted a fair amount of
attention from economists studying the theory of bargaining. See, e.g., Crawford, Long-Term
Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts, 78 AM. EcoN. REV. 485 (1988); Farrell &
Shapiro, Optimal Contracts with Lock-in, 19 AM. EcoN. REV. 51 (1989); Huberman & Kahn,
supra note 44; Tirole, Procurement and Renegotiation, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 235 (1986). Rules that
apply the consideration doctrine to limit the range of substantive exchanges possible at the modification stage, such as the common law preexisting duty rule and the rule of Foakes v. Beer, 9
App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884), alter bargaining by making it possible credibly to commit not to
agree to certain modifications. For a game-theoretic analysis of the preexisting duty rule, see
Graham & Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 9.
49. For those wishing more complete surveys of the game-theoretic approach to bargaining,
leading treatises include J. FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS TO EcoNOMICS
(1986); E. RAsMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (1989); M. SHUBIK, A GAME-THEORETIC
APPROACH TO PoLmCAL EcONOMY (1984); and M. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1982). Shorter but excellent introductions to the field can be found in J. ELSTER, THE
CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 50-96 (1989); and Aumann, Game Theory,
in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 460-82 (1987), to which my summary is greatly indebted.
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Marks, and Mnookin. 50 Suppose the parties are instructed simultaneously to submit a single, sealed demand. The demands are satisfied if
it is possible to do so, and any unclaimed leftover cake is split evenly;
otherwise the parties get nothing. The parties understand the rules of
play and know their opponents do as well.· In addition, each party has
some personal characteristics, such as attitudes toward risk or the rate
at which marginal utility from cake diminishes, that her opponent
cannot specifically observe and that affect her optimal bargaining
strategy. As a result, neither party can predict her opponent's demand
with certainty, but both may be able to do so probabilistically. While
this account is highly stylized, its underlying framework can be extended to more complicated environments involving multiple offers,
bargaining over a variable surplus, and the like.
Consider the likely result of this process. Each party, when selecting a demand, chooses between relatively tough and relatively soft demands, knowing her opponent faces the same opportunity. A tough
demand is more likely to be incompatible with the opponent's demand, and so risks a higher probability of winding up with no cake at
all. A soft demand lessens the chance of disagreement, but risks unnecessarily yielding cake if the opponent has also made a soft demand.
Each party will likely balance on the margin the probability of reaching a settlement against the value of getting a better settlement. Unless the parties are infinitely risk-averse, in general each will wish to
live with at least some chance of disagreement. This implies that the
outcome of bargaining cannot be fully Pareto efficient ex post. 51
The Cooter-Marks-Mnookin model, of course, is not the only possible analysis of the cake-division problem or indeed of bargaining generally. Its key premises include the assumption of single and sealed
offers, and the assumption that the parties lack the information needed
to deduce their opponents' optimal demands with certainty; minor assumptions such as the splitting of unclaimed cake between the parties
also affect the details if not the basic features of the outcome. There
are various alternative accounts of bargaining available, each of which,
like this one, manages to capture some aspects of actual bargaining.
None of the available accounts is entirely satisfactory; and in honesty
one must admit that economists do not yet understand bargaining all
that well. By this I mean simply that the discipline of economics as
50. Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
51. For a formal mathematical analysis of this model, see Chatterjee & Samuelson, Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, 31 OPERATIONS R.Es. 835 (1983). Myerson & Satterthwaite,
supra note 7, show that the sealed-bid procedure is as efficient as any that can be designed given
the informational constraints of the problem.
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yet possesses no canonical theory of bargaining that can be taken off
the shelf and applied to a variety of specific problems, in the way that
the model of perfect competition is widely applied to market behavior.
Although bargaining is fundamental to many important economic
phenomena entirely outside law and economics - such as bilateral
monopoly, labor-management relations, and the theory of the firm economists working on each of these problems will typically devise a
specific model of strategic behavior for the particular purpose at hand.
Despite the absence of a consensus theory of bargaining, economists generally do agree on the ways in which research about bargaining should proceed. Most existing work on the topic falls into one of
two basic paradigms: the cooperative (or axiomatic) approach and the
noncooperative approach. The cooperative paradigm has received attention primarily from mathematical economists and focuses on bargainers as a group more than as individuals. 52 The noncooperative
paradigm, conversely, of which the Cooter-Marks-Mnookin model is
an example, is distinguished by its attempt to describe individually rational behavior in situations of mutual recognized dependence; that is,
when the players understand that their actions both affect and are affected by the actions of others. Because the noncooperative paradigm,
like neoclassical economics as a whole, is clearly grounded in the postulate of individual utility maximization, it has been substantially
more influential than has the cooperative approach among applied
economists. 53 Furthermore, since the noncooperative approach usually is less abstract and is more closely tied to the particular strategic
environment at hand, it is better suited to the investigation of actual
institutions affecting bargaining. For these reasons, it is the approach
52. The resulting axiomatic analyses typically have two objectives: First, they attempt to
derive a solution to the bargaining problem by defining a set of normatively appealing features the axioms - that any solution should have. Typical axioms include efficiency and the invariance of the outcome to rescaling of quantitative measures. Second, they attempt logically to
deduce which of the possible outcomes satisfy these axioms. Kenneth Arrow's well-known "int·
possibility theorem," which has recently gained attention from legal scholars, represents this
paradigm if we interpret it as addressing the overall bargain inlplicit in the social contract. In
this context, Arrow's theorem states that none of the possible outcomes of the bargaining can
satisfy what he saw as a mininlally acceptable set of axioms. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963). A general but technical introduction to the axiomatic approach is found in Harsanyi, Bargaining. in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVB: A DICTIONARY OP EcoNOMICS, supra note 49, at 190-95. One frequently cited survey of research in the area is A.
ROTH, AxlOMATIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1985).
53. As applied economists have increasingly turned to game theory in recent years to help
analyze a wide selection of economic issues, pure game theorists have begun to devote greater
efforts to the unification of the two paradigms. For a leading example of this research program,
which seeks to build noncooperative models that yield particular axiomatic solutions as their
equilibria, see Binmore, Rubinstein & Wolinsky, The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic
Modeling. 17 RAND J. EcoN. 176 (1986).
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I follow in this article. 54
Several points require clarification. It is customary when constructing game-theoretic models to make a variety of standard assumptions that result in a fairly ·stylized analysis. Rationality, in
particular, is generally taken to mean that the participants (or "players") know the nature of the environment in which they operate. This
need not imply they have information about every relevant aspect of
the situation, but it does mean that they are aware (!f the extent to
which they are ignorant. Furthermore, it is generally assumed that
the players' computational abilities are unlimited; they can reason
through an arbitrary number of logical steps if necessary. In such a
context, individual maximization requires each party to select an optimal strategy - a complete plan of actions to be taken under all relevant contingencies.
A player's optimal strategy will depend on the strategies chosen by
other players; in this sense all players' strategies are interdependent.
There generally exist some configurations of strategies, however, such
that each individual party's strategy is an optimal response to the set
of strategies chosen by all the others. Such a set of choices is commonly felt to be a plausible outcome of the game, since no individual
player has the incentive unilaterally to change her behavior so long as
she assumes that all other players reason similarly. This situation is
referred to as a Nash equilibrium, after the mathematical economist
John Nash, who argued that unprofitability of individual deviations
should be a necessary condition for an outcome of a game to be considered stable. 55
The focus on Nash equilibria has been a standard feature of gametheoretic analyses for almost forty years and has found a number of
54. Much of the recent economic literature on litigation settlement relies on the noncooperative paradigm. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 404 (1984); Rosenberg & Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INTI.. RE.v. L. & EcoN. 3 (1985). In contrast, many economic
articles on civil procedure that presuppose bargaining as the background to litigation have implicitly adopted the cooperative approach. See, e.g., Miller, An Economic Analysis ofRule 68, 15
J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1986); Priest & Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation. 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984). The cooperative approach can, as these articles demonstrate, be useful if one
wants a stylized off-the-shelf model to help study the effects of some other legal rule - a sensible
course of action so that research on other questions does not come to a complete halt while
awaiting a satisfactory noncooperative account of bargaining.
55. See Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951). It may be
that given the opponents' strategies, alternative strategies are equally good for a player. In this
case Nash equilibrium requires only that each player's selection be weakly optimal: that is, one
of the set of equally good options. For a general introduction to the Nash criterion, as well as a
discussion of some of the refinements that have been suggested for it, see Kreps, Nash Equilibrium, in III THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcoNOMICS 584 (1987).
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applications in legal scholarship over the decades. 56 But modem research on bargaining has revealed that additional theoretical refinements, concerning information and the timing of the parties'
strategies, need to be imposed on bargaining models if useful results
are to be obtained. Without these modifications, many games - especially those in which the parties lack full information about their situation - have multiple Nash equilibria.
The most important of these refinements arise in strategic interactions that unfold over a period of time as opposed to instantaneously;
these types of interactions are commonly referred to in the formal
literature as sequential or extensive games. Rationality in sequential
games, it is usually felt, entails an additional requirement beyond the
unprofitability of individual deviation, which I refer to as sequential
rationality. A rigorous definition of this concept turns out to be fairly
subtle, but the intuitive idea is straightforward. A given strategy or
sequence of decisions is sequentially rational if and only if each possible shorter sequence of decisions contained within the strategy as a
whole is itself an optimal strategy when evaluated from the later vantage point at which the subsequence begins.
The practical meaning of sequential rationality is that no threat
can affect behavior unless the threat is credible. Alternatively, a
promise to take some action in the future will not be believed if it is
common knowledge that at the time of obligation it will not be in the
promisor's interest to carry out the promise. "Common knowledge"
in this context has a technical meaning; it implies that the opposing
party knows that carrying out the threat is not in the threatener's interest, that the threatener knows that the opponent knows this, that
the opponent knows that the threatener knows that the opponent
knows, and so on.
An illustration of this is provided by the finitely repeated version of
the familiar prisoners' dilemma game. In the one-shot prisoners' dilemma, individually rational behavior by the players leads to a collectively undesirable outcome. Those finding this outcome unappealing
have often suggested that repetition of the game would allow the players to escape the dilemma, since cooperation in earlier rounds could be
rewarded in kind in later rounds. But if the repetition is only for a
finite number of rounds, the proposed solution is not sequentially ra56. See, e.g., Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory ofSelf-Enforcing Collusion, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 295 (1987) (applying the concept to antitrust); Birmingham, Legal and Moral
Duty in Game Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 99
(1969) (applying the concept to contracts); Wiley, Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
556 (1987) (antitrust).
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tional. 57 For in the last round, which from the ex post perspective is
equivalent to the one-shot game, there can be no later reward to cooperation. The players will therefore be unable to restrain themselves
from acting selfishly in that round - and this is common knowledge
between them. As a result, cooperation in the next-to-last round
yields no reward either, leading the players to act selfishly in that
round also. And so on, as the chain of reasoning unravels all the way
back to the first round of play. 5 s
If each party's strategy is a sequentially rational response to everyone else's strategy, the resulting configuration is referred to as a sequential equilibrium, or alternatively (if the game is one of full
information) as a subgame pelfect equilibrium. As David Kreps has
explained: "If at any point in an extensive game, all players agree on
what has transpired, then 'what remains' is, by itself, an extensive
game. We might require that, in such circumstances, players expect
that the agreement for this subgame constitutes a Nash equilibrium for
the subgame." 59
A simple application of the difference between Nash and subgame
perfect equilibrium is found in the example of an immaterial breach of
contract. 60 Suppose a seller has substantially performed a contract to
sell, but that the goods delivered do not precisely accord to the contract description. Since the goods as delivered are worth slightly less
than the goods as promised, in theory the buyer may recover damages
equal to the difference in value. 61 Although the potential damages are
less than the anticipated cost of bringing suit, the buyer may nonetheless threaten to sue in hopes of inducing the seller to cure the defective
performance. If the buyer actually sues, however, both the buyer and
seller will be worse off.
Suppose the sequence of events requires the seller to decide
whether to cure before the buyer decides whether to bring suit. In this
case, the seller's possible strategies are to cure or not to cure, and the
57. See D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 98-99 (1957).
58. Repetition of the prisoners' dilemma can support cooperation ifthe players are uncertain
when the game will end, or if the repetition goes on infinitely, or if there is some uncertainty
whether one of the players actually prefers cooperation for its own sake. For further details, see
E. RAsMUSEN, supra note 49, at 88-96.
59. Kreps, supra note 55, at 586. Actually, there is a minor technical distinction, unimportant for our purposes, between the concepts of sequential equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. See id. at 586-87.
60. The example is taken from Leif, Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YALE LJ. 1 (1970).
61. According to U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (1987): "Where the buyer has accept<;d goods and given
notification •.• he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in
the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is
reasonable."
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buyer's possible strategies (which become relevant only if the seller
does not cure) are to carry out the threat to sue or not to carry out the
threat. One possible outcome is for the buyer to resolve to carry out
his threat, and for the seller to cure. This is technically a Nash equilibrium, because neither wants to deviate from his equilibrium strategy
given that the other does not. If the buyer will sue absent a cure, the
seller prefers to cure; and if the seller is going to cure, the buyer loses
nothing from his threat to sue.
This game has a second and more plausible Nash equilibrium,
however, which is for the seller not to cure and the buyer not to sue.
Neither wants to switch strategies given the other's strategy; if the
buyer is not going to sue, the seller does not want to cure, and if the
seller is not going to cure, the buyer does not want to sue. Only this
second outcome .is a sequential equilibrium. The problem with the
first equilibrium is that the buyer's threat to sue is not credible; once
the breach has occurred, it no longer pays to carry out the threat.
Furthermore, because the seller knows this (more precisely, because it
is common knowledge), she can safely decide not to cure.
The sequential equilibrium concept better captures our intuitions
about the outcome of this game - which are that cure is unlikely if
the buyer cannot commit in advance to sue. That is not to say that
buyers do not have remedies other than suit with which to encourage a
perfect tender. They may appeal to moral suasion, promises of future
business, or the like. Still, the most effective means of enforcement
likely will be those that are credible - or in game-theoretic terms,
sequentially rational - such as not dealing with an offending party in
the future.
These examples demonstrate the method of backwards induction
for finding the sequential equilibria of games with full information.
One first looks to every decision that is the last in some possible sequence of decisions (in this case, the buyer's decision whether to sue).
For each of these terminal stages, one determines the optimal choice
for the player whose turn it would be to decide, were that stage of the
sequence ever to be reached. This completed, one then determines
what the optimal choice would be in each possible penultimate stage,
given the choices that can be expected at the terminal stage. One can
then proceed to the antepenultimate stage and reason backwards
through the entire sequence of decisions, eventually reaching a sequential equilibrium for the game as a whole. Through this process, for
example, cooperation unraveled in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game.
The method of backwards induction is applicable only in games of
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full information, where the actions taken and the parties' payoffs are
common knowledge. The full information assumption may not be
completely realistic in every situation, but in some it may be an acceptable approximation. For instance, the simplest case of a full-information bargaining game is presented by single-offer negotiation, when
each side knows the other's assessment of the bottom line. Imagine I
own a book that I value at $5 and that you value at $15, that these
valuations are common knowledge, and that negotiation takes the form of a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. In this example, sequential
equilibrium implies that the party lucky enough to be in the position of
the offeror gets virtually the entire surplus from exchange. If I am the
offeror, I do best to offer to sell for $14.99, which I know you will
accept; and if you are offeror, you do best to offer to buy for $5.01,
which you know I will accept. 62
·
It is frequently useful to present bargaining games diagrammatically; this representation is often called the extensive form of a game.
The extensive form, or tree diagram, specifies the sequence in which
the players act, what they know when they move, the role of any
chance occurrences, and the payoff to each player at the end of each
possible combination of choices. It is a generalization of the decision
tree diagram widely taught in schools of business administration, in
which a single decisionmaker plots out the various consequences of all
her possible choices. A game tree with multiple players is similar, except that each branch specifies whose turn it is to act and what that
actor knows. The method of backwards induction can be described
metaphorically as starting with the endmost tWigs on a tree diagram
and successively pruning unused branches until one reaches the main
trunk.
The tree diagram for the take-it-or-leave-it game just described is
shown in Figure 1. The temporal sequence proceeds downwards from
the top of the diagram; first the seller decides on an offer, and only
then does the buyer have an opportunity to respond. At the end of
each terminal branch, an ordered pair - two quantities in parentheses, separated by a comma - indicates the net payoffs to both sides.
62. It should be evident from this example that the assumption of full information rarely will
be satisfied in practice. In reality, it is difficult for one party to Jmow the other's valuation of
relevant outcomes with precision, especially if one allows the possibility of nonmonetary or
psychic aspects of value. Furthermore, willingness to engage in exchange may depend upon
one's view of the fairness of the transaction, so that private valuations and the price paid may be
interdependent. See Kahneman, Knetch & Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, 16 AM. EcoN. REv. 728 (1986) (discussing evidence of this phenomenon in experimental settings). Accordingly, it is probably a good idea even in single-offer negotiation for the offerer to leave her opponent with a nontrivial share of the surplus, while still
finding out as much as feasible about the opponent's bottom line.
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Notation:
V: buyer's valuation of good
C: seller's valuation of good
P: sale price of good
Seller
Offer at

price P

(0,0)

Accept

(P-C, V-P)

(0,0)

Figure 1. Take-it-or-leave-it offer
The first quantity in the ordered pair refers to the seller's net gain or
loss, and the second quantity refers to the buyer's net gain or loss.
The take-it-or-leave-it game illustrates an essential point about sequential games: a change in the order of events can substantially alter
the outcome. Clearly it matters to the outcome which party gets to
make the offer. More technically, the order of events determines
which of a game's multiple Nash equilibria are sequential equilibria.
Recall the immaterial contract breach example discussed earlier. The
unique sequential equilibrium was for the seller not to cure and the
buyer not to sue. Now suppose instead that the buyer could commit
to suit before the seller decides whether to cure, perhaps by hiring a
particularly aggressive lawyer on retainer. In this case, the buyer's
threat to sue in event of an immaterial breach will become credible.
Since the seller then believes the threat, she will choose to make a
perfect tender. And given that perfect tender is rational for the seller
once the buyer has committed to sue, the buyer will want to commit to
sue so long as the cost of commitment is less than the value of ensuring a perfect tender.
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One could view the opportunity to precommit as adding an additional stage to the sequence, and could imagine continuing with additional preceding stages: the seller might precommit to spend a large
amount in litigation, guaranteeing that even if the buyer precommits,
both buyer and seller will lose money. If the seller can precommit
before the buyer has the chance to, the buyer's threat to precommit is
no longer credible, and vice versa. In this competition, having the first
move confers great advantage, just as being the offeror does in singleoffer bargaining.
In many actual bargaining environments, though, the full-information assumption is unrealistic. In order to get an accurate description
of the strategic structure, what information each player has and when
she has it must also be specified. This turns the game into one of incomplete or asymmetric information. If one specifies the informational
structure carefully, however, and if one assumes that parties understand the extent to which their information is incomplete, sequential
equilibria for these games can be found, using techniques that have
only recently come into wide use among applied economists. 63
While the methods for solving incomplete information games are
technical, their underlying principles are intuitively straightforward.
Even when information is incomplete, the players still may have some
more or less reliable sense of the possible situations and types of opponents they might be facing. Similarly, each player will have some
more or less accurate beliefs regarding the relative likelihood of each
of these alternatives. Following the approach of modern decision theory, each player's beliefs can be modeled as if they satisfied the requirements for a subjective probability distribution over the relevant
domain of possibilities. Each player is then viewed as making an optimal choice under conditions of uncertainty. She does this by maximizing her expected level of welfare given her beliefs about the relative
probability of relevant events and her attitudes toward risk. Furthermore, her beliefs satisfy a requirement I call Bayesian rationality: she
updates her beliefs about relative probabilities ai every point along the
way, drawing optimal inferences about her opponents' private information from their observable actions according to Bayes' rule of poste63. The theoretical innovations necessary to derive optimal strategies in incomplete information games were not developed until the late 1960s and 1970s. The seminal contributions generally are regarded to be those of Harsanyi, Games with Incomplete Information Played by
''Bayesian" Players (pts. 1-3), 14 MGMT. Sci. 159, 320, 486 (1967-1968); and Selten, Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept far Equilibrium in Extensive Games, 4 INTL. J. GAME THEORY 25
(1975). Wide application of the theory did not arise until the 1980s, following the work of Kreps
and Wilson and ofMilgrom and Roberts on predatory pricing. See, e.g., Kreps & Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. EcoN. THEORY 253 (1982); and Milgrom & Roberts,
Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information, 50 EcONOMETRICA 443 (1982).
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rior probabilities.64
The importance of subjective beliefs for the outcome of incomplete
information games requires an additional restriction on the equilibrium. The most generally accepted concept of equilibrium under these
circumstances is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, in which the players'
beliefs about the expected frequency of relevant events are accurate on
average, though not in every instance. In particular, their beliefs
about the likelihood of other players' actions correspond to the actual
frequencies with which their opponents choose those actions in
equilibrium.
This requirement is sometimes referred to as the rational expectations assumption, and has been the subject of some controversy in the
literature. Its appeal stems from the following argument: in a setting
of imperfect information, one would expect that the players' subjective
probability beliefs evolve from their own past experience in the market, or from some communication with other market participants.
Yet, for the outcome of strategic behavior to be stable, the players'
probability beliefs must also remain stable. If individual probability
beliefs diverged substantially from actual population frequencies, utility-maximizing actors would find it in their interest to update their
estimates from their own experience and from market reputations.
Accordingly, the original divergence between probability beliefs and
actual frequencies would not be stable in the long run and is not a
plausible candidate for equilibrium.6s
Even if one finds this line of argument persuasive, the amount of
time and learning needed to reach a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is an
empirical question. If the necessary time is large then an equilibrium
analysis may not be appropriate for either descriptive or normative
purposes. 66 Nonetheless, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium provides a
useful benchmark that may illuminate, if not approximate, the behavior of individuals in environments where they must take actions based
on their subjective beliefs about an uncertain reality.
64. On the economic theory of choice under uncertainty, see generally H. RAIFPA, DECISION
ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968). For a discussion of Bayes' rule, including philosophical arguments for and against its application, see
Good, Subjective Probability, in IV THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OP EcONOMICS,
supra note 49, at 537-42. Issues related to the application of Bayes' rule should be familiar to
scholars and teachers of the law of evidence. See generally Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing The Process of Proof. 66 B.U. L. REv. 439 (1986).
65. But see, for example, the classic article by Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
66. A discussion and defense of the rational expectation assumption may be found in
Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983); see also Cooter, Marks & Mnookin,
supra note 50, at 231-33.
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To summarize: in this Part, I have described the primary gametheoretic tools in common use among economists, and how economists
have used these tools to study the bargaining problem. Although the
literature on bargaining is a burgeoning one, and while there is substantial controversy regarding the direction of its futtire development,
there are no good alternatives to game theory if one wishes to investigate strategic incentives using the paradigm of rational choice. Accordingly, I argue that the limited understanding now available is
worth applying for the insight it can provide. Such insight cannot be
achieved, however, by just picking up a particular game-theoretic
model and plugging a specific institution into it. Before using game
theory to model real problems, its limitations must be carefully evaluated. Accordingly, the next Part attempts to outline both- the major
shortcomings of modern game theory and the main practical problems
involved in applying it. This helps cultivate the informed judgment
needed to apply the theory to the complicated and often confusing
contexts in which actual bargaining takes place.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH:
SOME CAVEATS

Which actions are individually rational in any particular strategic
setting depends critically on a variety of determinants, including the
range of individual characteristics and preferences of the participants,
the sequence in which players can make binding commitments, and
the players' information about their opponents' preferences and about
the opponents' prior and contemporaneous decisions. Specifying all
the relevant factors for any actual institutional process is a formidable
task. As with any attempt to use abstract theory for pragmatic purposes, we must devise a model of the reality we are trying to explain.
The goal of modeling is to dispense with the more inessential features
of reality in order to develop a tractable description of its more important aspects. 67 Constructing a useful model requires not just technical
skill in symbolic or even verbal manipulation, but sophisticated judgment in selecting which aspects of a complex reality to include. Descriptive accuracy must be balanced against parsimony and elegance.
The enterprise is in significant part an aesthetic one. 6s
67. While the modeling approach has been criticized by some more traditional legal scholars
as uselessly abstract, such critics fail to understand that the filtering out of complexities inheres
in any heuristic reasoning, either verbal or symbolic. For sympathetic yet self-critical introductions to the methodology of modeling, see, for example, E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 8-21 (1978); Gibbard & Varian, Economic Models, 75 J. PHIL. 664
(1978).
68. As Donald McCloskey has observed, a good model is like a good metaphor. D. Mc-
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The demands of modeling make applying game theory to specific
problems particularly challenging. In general, game-theoretic models
suffer from a lack of robustness compared with other economic models
in common use. 69 By this I mean that their conclusions are highly
sensitive to the particular specifications chosen. In addition, the relationship between premise and conclusion is often discontinuous, so
that in game-theoretic models - especially when incomplete information and timing are important to the strategic structure - approximately correct assumptions need not lead to approximately correct
predictions.
This differs from the study of market behavior generally. A major
reason that the model of perfect competition has been influential
among economists, for example, is that it is robust with respect to
variations in its specifications. Economists' confidence in the model
does not stem solely from the theorems they have developed that hold
that perfectly competitive markets are Pareto efficient. It also stems in
important part from informal arguments, as well as the occasional socalled "limit theorem," showing that almost perfectly competitive
markets are, in a certain well-defined sense, almost Pareto efficient. 70
Bargaining theory contains few limit theorems, so that each assumption can thus pose subtle yet critical modeling choices. As a result,
judgment, common sense, and a sensitive attention to institutional detail loom much larger here than they do in other fields of applied
economics.

A. Selecting the Best Formal Model
Correctly identifying all the relevant players is the first critical step
to building a useful model. Market structure may determine whether
offers come from many buyers and sellers or just a few. It also may
affect the informational background, since competition from similarly
situated individuals may provide incentives for players to reveal what
they would otherwise not. Whether parties bargain themselves or
have subordinates negotiate on their behalf also affects the outcome,
Cl.OSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF EcONOMICS 74-83 (1985). For the interested reader, McCloskey's
book provides a particularly thoughtful discussion of the aesthetics of modeling.
69. I am not going to be able to provide an exhaustive critique of the game-theoretic approach; instead, my purpose here is to warn newcomers of the sorts of problems typically encountered. For fuller discussions, see the sources listed at supra note 49. A more fundamental
critique of the entire enterprise has been put forward by Binmore, Modeling Rational Players, (pt.
1), 3 EcoN. & PHIL. 179 (1987); and Binmore, Modeling Rational Players, (pt. 2), 4 EcoN. &
PHIL. 9 (1988) (standard approach to rationality logically unattainable in theory; recommends
modeling rational players as finite automata).
70. See, for example, J. TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 226-28
(1988), and sources cited therein.
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since differences between the interests of principals ·and their agents
may augment the strategies available - a phenomenon familiar to any
attorney who has ever tried to settle a lawsuit. The creation of the
original arrangement between principal and bargaining agent also
could itself be viewed as part of the game.71
Second, intelligent modeling will require that the sequence of
choices be specified carefully, since a formal model will be unreliable if
it arbitrarily excludes available strategies players might wish to adopt
under the right circumstances. Much can tum on whether the bargaining must end by some determinate date or time, or whether it can
in principle continue indefinitely. Similarly, it may matter a great deal
whether the parties expect to repeat their negotiation at some point in
the future. The opportunity for additional rounds of play may encourage the parties to cooperate, since uncooperative behavior now
may be punished later. Opportunities to develop reputations for future use substantially enriches the array of possible rewards and punishments that the parties can bring to bear.72 As even the simple
models of the previous Part demonstrated, the omission of opportunities to commit to later actions, or even to make investments that alter
the payoffs from later actions, can materially alter a model's predictions. The opportunity to reconsider decisions after additional information becomes available, or even to delay, can substantially expand
the parties' strategic possibilities. It is not difficult to construct additional variations on this theme.
Third, specifying the informational setting of negotiation is essential and extremely delicate. If the structure and sequence of information is imprecisely formulated, the model's implications will be
unreliable and perhaps incoherent. 73 For instance, the capacity of one
player's earlier action to influence another's depends on the later
player knowing about the earlier's decision. If neither party learns the
result of the other's action until after making her own choice, the two
decisions are effectively simultaneous for strategic purposes, regardless
of their actual temporal sequence.
71. One can imagine that both the client's private information about and the attorney's internal assessments of the merits of the client's position would influence the contractual arrangement
they select - and that the form and content of the arrangement, if publicly verifiable, could
signal this information to the opponent.
72. Compare Galanter, Why the ''Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SocY. REv. 95, 97 (1974) (stressing distinction between "one-shot" and
"repeat" players in litigation).
73. The philosophical paradox known as "Newcomb's problem" provides a classic illustration of the confusion that can arise when the informational structure of a game is not precisely
described. See, e.g., Nozick, Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice, in EssAYS IN
HONOR OF CARL G. HEMPEL 114 (N. Rescher ed. 1969).
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The predictions of bargaining models can also differ depending
upon whether the incomplete information is taken to be one-sided
(only one party has information that the other does not) or two-sided
(each party has some information that the other does not). If the incomplete information is one-sided, the outcome can vary depending
upon whether the informed or uninformed party makes the first move.
If the informed party moves first, she risks that her actions may partially reveal her information, since individuals with different information generally can be expected to prefer different strategies. For this
reason, she might imitate the optimal strategy of someone with different information or characteristics from her own - that is, to bluffin order to mislead her opponent. Alternatively, she might take an
otherwise irrational action in order to distinguish herself from an imitator. Such phenomena are typically referred to in the economic literature as signaling. 74 In contrast, when the uninformed party makes
the first move, her problem is typically referred to as one of screening
(as when a seller offers a menu of contracts to a buyer of unknown
characteristics, in hopes of separating out high-valuation buyers from
the low-valuation buyers). When incomplete information is two-sided,
bargaining can incorporate both signaling and screening. 75
The bargaining models presented in the following Parts of this article will present difficulties of all these sorts, and may therefore ultimately require us, in the course of explaining the effects of the rules of
offer and acceptance, to consider aspects of contracting seemingly far
removed from the initial formation of agreement. While one might
have hoped that an analysis of offer and acceptance rules could be
confined to bargaining at the formation stage alone, the contract's ultimate enforceability and the availability of remedies for breach will influence the earlier negotiations. For this reason, ironically, more
orthodox legal scholars may ultimately find themselves more comfortable with the game-theoretic approach than with the price-theoretic
techniques that so far have been the primary methodology of law and
economics. In a sense, game theory lends support to the traditional
maxim that the law is a seamless web - that all that does happen
depends on all that might have happened. Nevertheless, such a tru74. Various phenomena arising in actual contracting may be motivated as signaling behavior.
A possible example is liquidated damages in excess of the promisee's expectation, which might be
adopted to signal the promisor's private information that the probability of breach will be low.
The institution of secured credit also has been explained in this way. See, e.g., Schwartz, A
Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989).
75. See, e.g., Ordover & Rubinstein, A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, 101 Q.J. EcoN. 879 (1986) (haggling arises as each party delays the bargain in simultane·
ous attempt to signal the low value she places on it and to screen the opponent's value).
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ism, while instructive, is not any more helpful to the practice of modeling than it is to the practice of constructing particular doctrinal
arguments. Attempting to consider all possible eventualities just
makes it impossible for us to focus attention on any issue in particular.
We simply will have to exercise pragmatic judgment in choosing a
model and interpreting the results we derive from it.
B. Limitations of the Game-Theoretic Approach

In addition to those considerations making it difficult to select
among game-theoretic models, the framework as a whole is vulnerable
to more basic criticisms that question the degree of rationality and
coordination it requires of the participants. One such objection challenges the descriptive usefulness of the concept of equilibrium. The
appeal of the Nash equilibrium stems from its stability once established, since no single player finds it in her interest to deviate from it.
One might legitimately ask, however, how such an outcome is ever
supposed to be reached in the first place.
A common response is that if the game were played repeatedly, the
players would through some process of adjustment converge to an
equilibrium. This response, however, both requires empirical defense
and suffers from a theoretical difficulty. If the parties understand at
the outset that the game is to be repeated, then the situation should be
viewed not as many individual games but as a single long one. The
equilibria of such a repeated game, for the reasons previously discussed, may be very different from the equilibria of the individual oneshot games that make up its rounds. 76
A second and perhaps more appealing response is provided by the
.notion of common knowledge. If all parties know the structure of the
game, and all know that the others know this (and so on), then each
should be able to deduce not just her own optimal strategy but also the
optimal strategies of the other players. It follows that the individual
players could calculate the Nash equilibrium themselves. Because
they know that all the others can do the same, they should realize that
it is the only sensible result.
Readers skeptical of formal models may question whether actual
bargainers are capable of such an intricate chain of reasoning. For
relatively simple games, however, the Nash equilibrium may be sufficiently obvious and appealing that parties will find it. There is in fact
empirical evidence suggesting that experimental subjects participating
76. See generally Fudenberg & Maskin, 11ze Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 EcoNOMETRICA 533-54 (1986).
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in supervised bargaining situations do manage to reach Nash equilibria.77 The bargaining games I have been discussing, however, are strategically richer than the typical laboratory experiment, and generally
have multiple equilibria. The existence of multiple equilibria raises
significant theoretical difficulties for the establishment of any particular one. It is not clear how parties could converge on a given equilibrium outcome through simultaneous deduction, because no individual
player can be sure that the others are aiming for the same equilibrium
that she is. Moreover, even if players could coordinate their strategies
and select a single equilibrium, it is unclear how to predict which one
they will choose.78
A more fundamental objection is that actual strategic situations
are sufficiently complex that one may lack confidence in the ability of
human players even to calculate their own optimal strategies. In the
words of one eminent game theorist:
For a long time it has been felt that both game and economic theory
assume too much rationality. For example, the hundred-times repeated
prisoners' dilemma has some 22100 pure strategies; all the books in the
world are not large enough to write this number even once in decimal
notation. There· is no practical way in which all these strategies can be
considered truly available to the players. On the face of it, this would
seem to render statements about the equilibrium points of such games
... less compelling, since it is quite possible that if the sets of strategies
were suitably restricted, the equilibria would change drastically. 79

While limited human capacity to consider all possible strategies may
render implausible the predictions of overly complicated models, however, it need not undercut the game-theoretic approach as a whole.
The fact that human rationality is bounded, rather, should increase
the usefulness of simple models of bargaining as opposed to complex
ones. So long as our own understanding of the strategic possibilities of
a given situation accords substantially with that of the actual players,
the strategies we exclude from the model may not be of empirical importance. Whether this is in fact the case, of course, depends upon our
skill and judgment in capturing the critical elements of actual institutions. Models of bargaining will be most useful if they are built on
insights arising from practical experience. 80
77. See, e.g., Plott, Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics, 20 J. EcoN.
LIT. 148S, 148S-93 (1982).
78. The multiple equilibrium problem has commanded substantial attention in the theoretical literature on game theory in recent years, motivating a vigorous debate that centers around a
variety of proposed conceptual refinements designed to narrow down the set of possible equilibria. So far, however, it is generally agreed that the problem has not yet been satisfactorily re·
solved. See Kreps, supra note SS.
79. Aumann, supra note 49, at 478.
80. Some scholars have conjectured that the explicit incorporation of bounded rationality
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I hope the foregoing catalog of cautions has not persuaded the
reader that the game-theoretic approach is so fraught with difficulty
that the project is not worth undertaking. My intention is, after all, to
argue that we should devote more attention to understanding bargaining, and I think the game-theoretic approach is better than any other
one currently available. I have simply tried to set forth the factors
that must be considered if this project is to be carried out with judgment and prudence. I suspect that readers will find the project to be
more sensible and appealing after examining some concrete
applications.
Accordingly, the next two Parts are primarily intended as illustrative. Given the theoretical limitations I have described, it would be
audacious to make strong policy prescriptions on the basis of the analyses presented here. Instead, I examine in more detail two particular
contract doctrines to demonstrate the research program I have in
mind, as well as the types of insights that might emerge from it. In the
next Part, I analyze the doctrine of acceptance by silence, using a simple full-information model of bargaining that can be analyzed using
the principle of backwards induction. Following this, in Part VI, I
present a more sophisticated bargaining model that allows for incomplete information, and use it to analyze the effects of imposing a duty
to read the fine print in standardized form contracts. The chief purpose of this latter example is to illustrate the importance of specifying
the strategic structure of bargaining in careful detail.
V.

A FULL INFORMATION MODEL: ACCEPTANCE BY SILENCE

In this Part, I consider the rule of acceptance by silence to show
how even simple bargaining models premised on full information can
help illuminate the law of offer and acceptance. While I do not mean
to claim that imperfect information is unimportant in this setting, I
want to begin with a straightforward example of the research program
I advocate. The purpose is less to provide a realistically useful analysis of the rule, which was selected in large part to illustrate the technique, than to show how an analysis might be possible. Nonetheless,
the full-information analysis can reveal important strategic features of
existing legal doctrine. s1
will ultimately make game-theoretic models more robust and will eliminate implausible equilibria
that cannot be ruled out from the viewpoint of perfect rationality. See, e.g., Binmore, supra note
69.
81. Some of the considerations that would arise in a fuller analysis will be alluded to in the
discussion below. For a more thorough and technical investigation of the doctrine, see A. Katz,
Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Contract Formation: When Should Silence in the
Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance? (1990) (manuscript available from the author).
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The Doctrinal Background

It is a basic feature of Anglo-American contract law that the person who proposes an exchange has substantial control over the structure of the bargaining - a fact captured in the maxim that "the
offeror is master of his offer." The theoretical justification for this
stems from the principle of freedom of contract. Since the offer, by its
terms, defines the proposed exchange both in form and in content, the
offeror a fortiori should have the power to specify what sort of response counts as a valid acceptance. According to the Restatement:
"Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms
thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the
offer." 82
For instance, an offeror is free to require that acceptance take place
by a given date, be communicated according to a particular medium
such as telex, or be written on a certain shape and size of paper. The
offeror also has power to countermand certain of the standard common law presumptions that govern contract formation - for example,
by specifying that any acceptance will not be effective until personally
received by the offeror. 83 The offeror's control over the form of acceptance is limited, however, by various rules designed either to protect the offeree's contractual freedom or other social objectives.
One important limit on the offeror's power to set the terms of the
bargain arises when the offeror wishes to specify that the offeree need
do nothing at all in order to accept. For instance, a seller of goods
might send a letter stating that a shipment of merchandise will be sent
in ten days unless the recipient sends a notice of objection. If such an
offer were valid and the recipient wanted to purchase the goods at the
stated price, he could merely wait for the goods to arrive. 84 A slightly
more presumptuous seller might ship the merchandise unordered,
along with a cover letter stating that the recipient should simply keep
the shipment if he wishes to buy, and return the shipment if he does
not. A truly aggressive seller might try to make acceptance arise not
fro,m inaction, but from some affirmative action that the buyer would
have taken in the absence of an offer - for example, opening for business as usual on the following Monday morning.
82. RE.s'fATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 50(1) (1979).
83. The usual rule is that an acceptance is valid upon its dispatch by the offeree. See, e.g.,
RE.sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 63 (1979): "Unless the offer provides otherwise, (a)
an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes
the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard
to whether it ever reaches the offeror •..."
84. In discussing this model, I adopt the convention that the offeror is female and the olferee
is male. In the succeeding Part, the convention is reversed.
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A seller might want to try these approaches for any of a variety of
reasons. First and most innocently, in those cases where the buyer
does wish to accept and the seller knows this, the expense of an extra
communication is saved. Second, the buyer .can enjoy the use of the
goods at an earlier time (especially when the merchandise is shipped
along with the offer), which may make the offer more valuable to him.
Third, putting the goods in front of the buyer may be an effective marketing technique; it may increase the buyer's desire for the goods and
the price he is willing to pay for them. Fourth, the seller may regard
this as a way of demanding the buyer's attention in order to get him to
consider the offer. Fifth, the buyer might be induced by the trouble,
expense, or inconvenience of affirmatively responding to accept an offer he would not otherwise entertain. Some of these reasons obviously
are more laudable than others.
As a matter of prevailing doctrine, however, failing to reply to an
offer can operate as an acceptance only in certain special circumstances. 85 The Restatement summarizes the common law rule:
(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction
operates as an acceptance in the following cases only:
(a) Where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they
were offered with the expectation of compensation.
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and
the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the
offer.
(c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to
accept.
(2) An offeree who does any act inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property is bound in accordance with the offered terms
unless they are manifestly unreasonable. But if the act is wrongful as
against the offeror it is an acceptance only if ratified by him. 86

Each of the circumstances listed suggests a different reason for binding
the offeree, corresponding to the main justifications commonly offered
in favor of the more basic duty to keep promises. The chief implicit
rationale of subsection (l)(a) is restitution. When the offeree silently
and knowingly appropriates the benefits of offered services, and he had
85. See McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968) (defendant lawyer's silence was
not assent to handle plaintiff's tort claim against a third party, though statute of limitations ran
on claim eight weeks after lawyer received plaintiff's letter authorizing the representation); Prescott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305, 42 A. 352 (1898) (insured's silence was not assent to renew fire
insurance policy, though insurer stated it would issue a renewal unless notified otherwise). A
survey of the relevant precedents is found in Grosse, Silence as Acceptance, 9 S.U. L. REv. 81
(1982).
86. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 69 (1979).
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a reasonable opportunity to reject, he will be unjustly enriched if he
does not pay, so his silence is conventionally taken to imply consent.
If the services were of no actual benefit, in contrast, there would be no
enrichment; and if there were no reasonable opportunity to reject, any
enrichment would not be unjust. s7 The rationale applies only to services because unlike goods, services cannot be returned once bestowed.
An analogous principle animates subsection (2), however, because if
goods are offered under similar circumstances and the offeree actually
uses them, disgorgement usually will be a less than perfect remedy.ss
The chief implicit rationale of subsection (1 )(b), in contrast, is reliance or estoppel. If the offeree is led to believe that he can accept by
silence and attempts to so accept, he may rely on the existence of a
bargain in various ways. Enforcement of the original offer is necessary
on this theory to protect the offeree's change of position, which may be
difficult if not impossible to prove directly - especially if reliance
takes the form of forgoing substitute exchanges. s9 The reliance rationale can cut both ways, of course. Even if the offeree does not wish to
accept, an extended and otherwise unnecessary silence on his part can
induce the offerer to infer acceptance and to rely. ~n the view of
(l)(c), the offeree might reasonably be demanded to reject affirmatively
in order to protect the offerer's reliance interest. 90
87. A hypothetical I have used in my contracts class involves the windshield washing services motorists can obtain on New York City street comers while waiting for red lights to change.
Is there a reasonable opportunity to reject? Native New Yorkers disagree among themselves.
88. A provision of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 749,
found in 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1988), reverses the rule of § 69(2) for goods delivered through the
U.S. mails; many states have enacted similar statutes. The statutory language suggests a legislative purpose to protect consumers unfamiliar with the common law rule from fraud or
intimidation:
Mailing of unordered merchandise.
(a) Except for (1) free samples clearly and conspicuously marked as such, and (2) merchan·
dise mailed by a charitable organization soliciting contributions, the mailing of unordered
merchandise or of communications prohibited by subsection (c) of this section constitutes an
unfair method of competition and an unfair trade practice [under the Federal Trade Commission Act].
(b) Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the
exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the
right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation
whatsoever to the sender. All such merchandise shall have attached to it a clear and con·
spicuous statement informing the recipient that he may treat the merchandise as a gift ••••
(c) No mailer of any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or
within the exceptions contained therein, shall mail to any recipient of such merchandise a
bill for such merchandise or any dunning communications.
39 u.s.c. § 3009 (1988).
89. The reliance rationale is underscored by the Restatement's requirement that the offeree
subjectively intend to accept - a qualification otherwise uncomfortably at odds with the general
trend in modern contract doctrine toward an objective theory of assent. I discuss the objectivesubjective tension in the doctrine at greater length in section V.C below.
90. An illustration of this possibility is found in the case of Kukuska v. Home Mut. HailTomado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W. 403 (1931), where an insurance company retained a
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The third rationale - that of bargain - is suggested by the phrase
"because of previous dealings" in subsection (l)(c) and to a lesser extent underlies the other subsections as well. Silence will be acceptance
if the parties have agreed on such an arrangement for their mutual
convenience. For example, when one joins the Book-of-the-Month
Club one consents, in exchange for certain up-front benefits, to participate in the Club's negative option plan. The bargain rationale should
in principle extend to implicit agreements as well as explicit ones,
though their existence may be more difficult to establish in practice.91
None of these rationales, however, provides a real account of why
silence should qualify as acceptance in some situations and not in
others. Instead, they merely characterize the exceptions to the general
rule rather than explain them. For instance, the unjust enrichment
rationale assumes that an offeror can in some circumstances either presume the offeree's consent or legitimately put him to the trouble of a
response. Otherwise the offeror has either acted officiously or with
donative intent, and the offeree's retention of proffered benefits ought
not to be viewed as unjust. 92 If we presume initially that silence is not
a valid form of acceptance, it is hard to see why an offeror should
reasonably expect compensation when providing goods or services in
the absence of some affirmative indication on the offeree's part that the
efforts are desired.
Similarly, the estoppel rationale presupposes its conclusion, since it
requires that any reliance be a reasonable response to the other party's
behavior in order to deserve protection. It is hard to see why reliance
on silence would be reasonable given a background rule that silence is
not ordinarily an authorized form of acceptance. Only if the basic
background rule were otherwise would reliance on it be reasonable;
farmer's application and deposit for a hail insurance policy for an extended period after the
application was solicited, and then rejected the application just hours before a severe hailstorm.
Although the application was never accepted explicitly, the court found that the insurer's retention of the farmer's offer past the time that insurance could be obtained elsewhere breached an
implied duty to respond within a reasonable time. What made the Kukuska result particularly
compelling was that the insurer's silent retention of the deposit effectively prevented the applicant from applying to any other insurer.
91. It should be apparent that any arrangement under which the parties contract out of the
ordinary rules of offer and acceptance must be established by "previous dealings," that is, prior
to the offer in question. An unsolicited offer that designates silence as acceptance cannot properly be interpreted as an offer to vary formation rules between the parties. In order to be legally
cognizable such an arrangement needs to be formed according to the rules in force at the time of
the offer, and not according to the hoped-for rules the parties are trying to establish.
92. If the offerer is ignorant of the background rule regarding silence as acceptance, it might
be unjust to take advantage of her ignorance. But over time, as the convention becomes established, the number of those ignorant of the rule should be few. Requiring restitution would then
be an instance of the general equitable principle that it is wrong to profit from another's ignorance, but would not justify a specific doctrinal exception to the law of acceptance.
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but then legal obligatiOn could be founded directly on the background
rule rather than indirectly on the reliance.
In addition, while the consent rationale can explain why parties
who have made their own arrangements regarding the meaning of silence are entitled to have those arrangements respected, it cannot explain why parties should have to contract into a rule of silence as
acceptance rather than contract out of it. Clearly we might have a
regime in which silence was generally understood as acceptance, and
still respect the wishes of individuals who want to arrange that this
default rule would not apply to their private dealings. The Restatement does not tell us why such a regime is inferior to the one we happen to have.
The commentators also have justified existing doctrine in terms of
customary understanding alone. Both Williston and Corbin ground
their defense of the black-letter rule on the rationale that ordinarily
the parties will not reasonably expect silence to indicate assent. This
is, of course, merely an argument that such expectations reflect the
present rule, not that the present rule is preferable.93 More recently,
Farnsworth, the current Reporter to the Restatement, has explained:
"[A]n offeree's silence in the face of an offer ... is not ordinarily an
acceptance, because the offeror has no reason to believe from the offeree's silence that he promises to buy."94
All these standard responses, like the more general arguments for
promise-keeping on which they are based, reflect a perspective of convention maintenance. They arise from the need to describe and maintain the preexisting convention regarding whether silence is to be
taken as assent, but when offered to justify that convention they are
unhelpful. In order to explain what the default rule should be a priori,
one must offer reasons that can distinguish between alternate conventions. For instance, one might argue on libertarian grounds that ac93. "Generally speaking, an offeree need make no reply to offers, and his silence and inaction
cannot be construed as an assent to the offer; but the relations between the parties or other
circumstances may have been such as to have justified the offeror in expecting a reply, and,
therefore, in assuming that silence indicates assent to his proposal." WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 91 (3d ed. 1957) ("When Silence and Inaction May Amount to Assent"). Similarly, Corbin
states:
Silence may indicate that the offeree did not hear or receive or understand the offer; or it
may indicate that he preferred to give no thought to the offer and to waste no time and effort
in making a reply, whether orally or by a writing. In such cases, the offeror is not reasonable in giving to the offeree's mere silence an interpretation that he accepts ••••
[The exceptions to the rule] are all cases in which the conduct of the party denying a
contract has been such as to lead the other reasonably to believe that silence, without communication, would be sufficient.
CoRBIN ON CoNTRACTS §§ 72, 75 (1963).
94. E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 3.15 (1982).
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ceptance by silence should be the exception rather than the rule, to
protect the offeree's right to be let alone. This comes closer to suggesting a functional justification for the prevailing doctrine, but does
not by itself explain the commonly articulated exceptions. Nor does it
spell out either the distributive or allocative consequences of the rule,
or just how it protects the offeree's privacy.
With a simplified account of contract bargaining, however, some of
the functional consequences of the common law rule and its various
alternatives can be examined. Before developing a formal presentation, however, let me try to provide some heuristic motivation for the
modeling choices I have made. To fix a specific image in the reader's
mind, I will speak throughout as if the offeror is a seller of goods and
the offeree is a buyer, but nothing in the argument turns on this characterization. While a host of strategic considerations might be incorporated into the analysis, my objective at the moment is to be a
parsimonious rather than an exhaustive modeler. Accordingly, I have
tried to identify the minimal set of considerations needed to make the
model useful and interesting.
Which features of the problem are the essential ones? To begin
with, the model must provide an opportunity for at least two messages
to pass between the parties, to admit an alternative to silence as a
mode of acceptance. Second, some positive cost should be associated
with a message; otherwise all opportunities for communication would
be exploited. Third, the model should admit a variety of possible sellers' costs and buyers' valuations, for otherwise full efficiency could be
achieved trivially by a rule that either decreed or forb~de an exchange,
depending upon whether the buyer's valuation was greater or less than
the seller's cost. Fourth and finally, the contract price should be determined endogenously within the model rather than prescribed at the
outset, because parties can find mutual advantage in bargaining
around the constraints of legal rules only by adjusting price.
I have deliberately omitted from the model a number of interesting
and important complications. I ignore the possibility that the parties
to an exchange may want to engage in reliance investments, although
the cost to the parties of an additional communication may be interpreted to incorporate the costs of such reliance. Perhaps more significantly, I also abstract from the costs of enforcing contracts in the
courts ex post. I am effectively assuming either that enforcement is
costless or that individuals are led by considerations of reputation to
keep their contractual obligations. 95 In a full analysis of contract bar95. I defend this decision on the grounds that problems of costly enforcement have been
acknowledged and widely analyzed in the law and economics literature, and that my main pur-
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gaining, of course, the remedial provisions of the law would at some
point have to be considered.
One last doctrinal clarification, related to the issues of modeling I
have been discussing, is necessary before turning to the substantive
discussion. I use the term "offeror" in this and in the next Part to
refer to the person who initiates the bargaining. In actual practice,
however, many communications that initiate bargaining do not legally
qualify as offers, even if the parties refer to them as such in ordinary
parlance. As a matter of technical doctrine, a communication requesting or suggesting an exchange is not an "offer'' unless it would be
reasonably understood to empower its recipient to create a binding
contract by simple assent. 96 If more than one additional communication is necessary in order to conclude the exchange, for example to
settle its secondary terms, then no offer has yet been made.
This distinction does not arise in the formal model, which assumes
that the bargaining is of a take-it-or-leave-it form. A more realistic
model of bargaining would incorporate several bargaining stages, and
admit that a number of communications are often necessary before
either party even reaches the point of inviting the other to make an
offer. I will speak in this Part, however, as if the bargaining process
contains just two relevant communications - the offer and the acceptance. I therefore will ignore the parties' ability to make counteroffers,
not to mention the additional possibilities of revocations, withdrawals,
and temporizing responses. Even so stylized a simplification as this
will reveal important effects of prevailing legal doctrine on the outcome of negotiation. Although it may be helpful to interpret the
model as focusing only on the penultimate stage of negotiations, one
should keep in mind that strategically important features of the law
may be suppressed in the analysis.
B.

The Formal Model

Consider a bargain over the sale of a book. Suppose the seller's
cost of providing the book, denoted as C: and the value that the buyer
attaches to the book, denoted as V, are precisely measurable. I will
pose here is to illuminate the process of precontractual bargaining. See, e.g., Kaplow, Private
Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1986); Menell, A Note on Private
Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1983); Polinsky
& Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level ofLiability, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 151 (1988); Shaven, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal
System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982).
96. The standard definition is found in the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 24
(1981): "An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it."
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refer to these quantities as the seller's and buyer's respective reservation prices. The strategic sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 2,
with earlier events appearing toward the top of the diagram. Initially,
the seller must decide whether to offer the book for sale at all. If she
does make an offer, she must also select a specific price, which is denoted as P. It costs the seller a fixed amount, denoted as S, to send or
otherwise communicate the offer to the buyer, but this cost need only
be paid if an offer is actually made. If the seller makes no offer, the
bargaining ends without g~ or loss for either side. This outcome is
denoted by the ordered pair (0,0) that appears at the end of the
rightmost branch in Figure 2. If the seller does make an offer, on the
other hand, the buyer is then faced with a decision whether to accept,
reject, or ignore the offer. I assume that it does not cost the buyer
Notation:
V: buyer's valuation of good
C: seller's valuation of good
P: sale price of good
S, R: cost of sending and
receiving messages
Seller

(0,0)

remain
silent

(P-S-C, V-R-P)
(P-S-C, V-R-P)

reject

(-S, 0)
(-S,-R)
(P-S-C, V-P) (-S,-R)

Figure 2. Acceptance by silence

Common law regime (I)
Silent acceptance regime (II)
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anything to read and consider the offer, and that he actually does so. 97
If the buyer simply ignores the offer after reading it, he thereby incurs
no direct cost, although depending on the legal rule in force, the inaction may obligate him to purchase the book. In order affirmatively to
reject or accept the offer, however, the buyer must communicate a return message to the seller; and the cost of his response is denoted as R.
Following the buyer's decision, the bargaining ends, and trade takes
place if and only if a contract was formed under the legal rule that
happens to be in force. I assume that the established legal rule and the
specific values of all relevant parameters - V, C: S, and R - are
common knowledge.
The parties' respective gains or losses in the series of events that
can follow an offer will depend upon the legal rule in force. The bottom two lines of Figure 2 show the payoffs under two alternate doctrinal regimes. The first set of payoffs, labeled (I), are those that follow
under the usual common law rule, which holds that no contract is
formed unless the buyer explicitly accepts. 98 The second set of
payoffs, labeled (II), correspond to a hypothetical legal regime in
which silence implies acceptance.
Under the first regime, the payoffs at the end of each sequence of
events are calculated in the following manner: If the buyer explicitly
accepts the seller's offer, the seller receives the sales price P, and incurs
production cost C and communication cost S for a net payoff of (P - S
- C). The accepting buyer nets (V -R -P); he enjoys value V, incurs
communication cost R, and must pay P to the seller. If on the other
hand the buyer explicitly rejects the seller's offer, the parties' payoffs
are (-S, -R); no sale is concluded, but each side loses the cost of a
message. Finally, if the buyer ignores the seller's offer, the buyer
neither gains nor loses anything, and the seller loses S, the cost of
sending her offer initially.
Under the second regime, the payoffs following any explicit response by the buyer are the same as under the common law. The only
difference occurs if the buyer ignores the seller's offer, in which case
the offer is accepted by silence. In this case, the seller nets (P - S - C),
just as if the buyer had explicitly accepted, and the buyer nets (V - P)
(value less price, and no costs spent responding to the offer).
Since the game is one of full information, the outcome can be
found in straightforward fashion through the method of backward in97. The model of form-contract bargaining presented in the following Part relaxes this
assumption.
98. I ignore the complications of Restatement section 69(l)(b) for the moment, returning to
it in the next subsection.
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duction. First, one looks to see what the buyer would find rational to
do if faced with an offer to buy, and then one finds the seller's optimal
offer given the buyer's expected response. Focusing on the buyer, it
should be obvious that he will never choose to reject under the first
regime or accept under the second. In either case he can do strictly
better by remaining silent and saving the cost of a response. Under the
common law he will simply choose between accepting and ignoring,
and will accept if and only if his net gain from doing so is positive.
This will be the case if the price offered is sufficiently low; that is, if P
< V-R.99
Under the silent-acceptance regime, alternatively, the buyer
chooses between rejecting and ignoring, and will reject if and only if
his loss from remaining silent is greater than the cost of a response.
This will be the case if the offered price is sufficiently high; that is, if
P > V + R. Since she can anticipate the buyer's reaction, the seller
when making an offer will in either case want to set her price just low
enough to induce the buyer to purchase. Offering a lower price than
necessary fails to maximize her profits; offering a higher price is suboptimal because she is better off saving the cost of a message than making
an offer she knows the buyer will reject. 100
Notice that under either regime there exists some maximum
amount - call it the buyer's net reservation price - that the seller can
obtain from the buyer in a sale. The buyer's net reservation price differs under the two regimes, however, and is lower under the common
law. This is because in order to get the buyer to accept under the
common law, the price must be below his gross valuation V by enough
to justify spending R on a response. To get buyer to accept under
regime II, in contrast, the price can be above his valuation by as much
as the cost of a response, since he must spend that amount in order to
avoid being bound. It follows that the price charged by a rational
seller will equal V + R under regime II and will equal V - R under
regime I. The difference between the two prices will be exactly twice
the buyer's cost of responding.
For the final step in the induction, we must determine whether an
offer will be made at all. Because the seller can always earn a return of
zero by doing nothing, and because making an offer is costly, she will
99. I assume that if the buyer is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing, he
chooses to purchase. Similarly, I assume that if the seller is indifferent between selling and not
selling, she chooses to sell. This simplifies the discussion and makes no difference to the analysis.
100. This particular feature of the model is an artifact of the full-information assumption. In
a more complicated analysis, sellers who are uncertain of their customers' reservation prices will
generally want to make an offer that will be rejected by low-value buyers, in order to get a higher
return from high-value buyers.
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want to make an offer if and only if the maximum price she can obtain
will cover her combined costs of production and communication.
Under regime I, this will be the case if and only if V - R > C + S.
Under regime II, it will be the case if and only if V + R > C + S.
We can now summarize the equilibrium outcomes under each of
the alternate legal regimes. Under the common law, the equilibrium is
for no offer to be made when V - R < C + S, and otherwise for an
exchange to be concluded at price P = V - R. Under the silent-acceptance rule, the equilibrium is for no offer to be made when V + R
< C + S, and otherwise for an exchange to be concluded at price P =
V+R.
The analysis predicts that fewer sales will take place under regime
I than under regime II. Only when the gross potential surplus from
trade, (V- C), exceeds the sum of the two communication costs, R +
S, will the seller offer an exchange that the buyer will accept under the
common law. In contrast, for this to occur under regime II, the gross
surplus from trade must exceed the difference of the two communication costs - which is necessarily less than the sum. Intuitively, a
buyer of given valuation is more willing to accept a higher price under
regime II; for this reason a seller facing a given production cost is
more willing to make an offer initially.
Since the sum of communication costs is necessarily positive while
the difference may be negative, regime II, but not the common law,
permits slightly inefficient exchanges to take place. Indeed, this will
occur whenever the cost of a buyer's response exceeds the seller's cost
of an offer, and when production cost C is not too greatly above the
buyer's value V. Grossly inefficient exchanges cannot take place even
under regime II, however, because if C is too far above V, the buyer
will reject any offer that the seller would want to make - and the
seller, anticipating this, will make no offer.
Regime II might therefore appear inefficient. On the other hand,
regime II does allow those marginally desirable exchanges that under
the common law are not worth the cost of a response. It also allows
those sales that would occur under either regime to be concluded with
one message rather than two. A more complete accounting is necessary to resolve the issue.
The relative efficiency of the two regimes is compared graphically
in Figure 3. The horizontal axis on the graph measures the potential
surplus from a sale gross of any communication costs, (V - C), an
amount that varies among types of buyers and sellers. The vertical
axis measures the net social surplus that remains after buyers and sellers exercise their optimal strategies and all costs of communication are
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subtracted out. This net surplus depends upon the legal regime in
force, and also on the potential value of (V- C) the-parties happen to
start with.

Net su'rplus
from trade

Regime I
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Regime II
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Figure 3. Welfare effects of differing acceptance rules
This dependence is shown in Figure 3 by two lines. The common
law rule is represented by the broken and kinked line marked "Regime
I." This line coincides with the horizontal axis of the drawing for
values of (V - C) to the left of the point marked S + R (for the sake-of
legibility, it is drawn slightly above the axis), and rises dollar-for-dollar to the right of that point. This is because a sale takes place under
the common law if and only if (V - C) exceeds S + R. Net social
surplus therefore equals zero for (V - C) less than S + R, and equals
(V - C - S - R) for (V - C) greater than S + R (a deal requires two
messages, the cost of which must be deducted to find net surplus).
The silent-acceptance rule is represented by the dotted line marked
"Regime II," which coincides with the horizontal axis for values of (V
- C) to the left of S - R (it is drawn slightly below the axis for legibility), jumps downward at that point, and rises dollar-for-dollar ·to the
right of it. Under the silent-acceptance regime, a sale takes place if
and only if (V - C) exceeds the lower cutoff point S - R. When (V -
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C) is less than that cutoff point, there is no offer and social surplus is
zero. When (V - C) is above that cutoff point, the net social surplus is
(V - C - S) - gross surplus less the cost of one message.

Not surprisingly, Figure 3 reveals that neither legal regime is uniformly more efficient under all circumstances. Instead, which regime
is best depends on the value of potential gross surplus (V - C), and
there are three relevant ranges of this quantity. When (V - C) is less
than the difference in communication costs S - R, as will be the case
for parties with sufficiently small or negative gross surplus, the two
regimes are equivalent in efficiency terms: no sale will be made and no
messages will be sent under either formation rule.
For an intermediate range of values, where gross surplus (V - C) is
less than the cost of a seller's message S but greater than the difference
between the two message costs, S - R, the common law regime is more
efficient. No sale takes place under the common law, and a wasteful
sale takes place under the alternative regime. The regime-II sale is
wasteful because the gross social surplus obtained is less than the cost
of sending the seller's offer. The seller finds this profitable, since she
profits from the offer's nuisance value, but the buyer's loss exceeds the
seller's gain. The advantage of avoiding such opportunistic offers corresponds graphically to the shaded triangular area marked A in Figure

3.
Finally, when the parties' gross potential surplus (V - C) exceeds
the cost of the seller's message S, the silent-acceptance regime is superior. The reason for this differs slightly, depending upon whether the
gross surplus is greater or less than the sum of both message costs.
When gross surplus is greater than the cost of one message but less
than the cost of two messages, a sale will take place under regime II
but not under regime I. Since under regime II the sale can be concluded with a single message, it is socially desirable, although marginally so. The efficiency gain from such marginal sales corresponds to
the triangular area marked B in Figure 3. When gross surplus is
greater than the cost of two messages, a sale will take place under
either regime. But it is cheaper to achieve this with one message
rather than two, and the cost savings from doing so corresponds to the
unshaded quadrilateral area marked C in Figure 3.
Since neither regime is uniformly superior, the overall efficiency
ranking of the two depends on their average performance over the entire heterogeneous population of buyers and sellers, and thus on the
frequency distribution of the various possible costs and valuations.
This analysis cannot provide unambiguous support, therefore, for any
universal theory of the efficiency of the common law, such as that
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prominently associated with the work of Richard Posner. In fact,
under some reasonably plausible assumptions regarding the -distribution of reservation prices, just the reverse conclusion follows. For instance, suppose it is just as likely for gross surplus to fall in the low
range bounded by the difference in communication costs S - R and the
seller's communication cost S, as it is to fall into the medium range
bounded by the seller's cost S and the sum of communication costs S
+ R. Since the ranges are of equal width, this supposition seems plausible in the absence of contrary evidence. 101 It follows then that the
advantage of the common law regime in avoiding marginally wasteful
sales (depicted by area A) exactly balances the advantage of the silentacceptance regime in achieving the marginally desirable sales that the
common law regime misses (depicted by area B). The silent-acceptance regime then comes out ahead on balance, because the sales that
would take place under either regime are achieved at lower cost (area
C).
Alternatively and perhaps more simply, if the cost of the buyer's
return message is small in magnitude, then the silent-acceptance regime is more efficient than the common law. To see this, observe that
the costs represented by all three areas A, B, and C in Figure 3 are
small when R is small. The costs represented by areas A and B, however, are doubly small; not only is the efficiency difference per exchange small, but the number of buyers and sellers falling into those
zones is also small. Hence, area C outweighs area A in magnitude, and
the savings from consummating trade with a single message dominates
any countervailing advantages of the common law rule.1°2
One hesitates to draw any very strong conclusions from the foregoing analysis, given its illustrative character and the simplified assumptions that went into it. The model can be interpreted, nevertheless, to
suggest that some of the specific common law exceptions· of the Restatement are justifiable on efficiency grounds. For instance, if the offeree has "reasonable opportunity to reject" proffered services
(subparagraph (l)(a)), the cost to him of a response is presumably
small, in which case acceptance by silence is the efficient rule under
my analysis. The cost of declining to exercise dominion over proffered
101. A possible objection to this argument is that I have implicitly and unwarrantedly assumed that the buyer's response cost is the same under either legal regime. One important reason why it might not be is that the seller might be able to influence it by the nature or timing of
her offer, and that her incentive to do this will depend on the legal rule in force. I consider this
possibility more fully in section V.D below.
102. In the technical calculus of infinitesimals, the efficiency gains measured by Care offirstorder magnitude (small in height, but not in width) while the gains measured by areas A and B
are of second-order magnitude (small in both height and width).
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goods is probably also small under most circumstances; accordingly,
the rule in subparagraph (2) that makes the exercise of such dominion
operate as an acceptance may be efficient as well.
Conversely, even when the cost of a buyer's response is large, acceptance by silence can still be more efficient, so long as either the
surplus from exchange is sufficiently large or the chances are high that
it is large. The limiting case of this, of course, is the physician who
furnishes medical services to an unconscious pedestrian, in the belief
that the pedestrian will pay for them upon regaining consciousness.
Here the offeree's response cost is very high, although not infinite (the
pedestrian could arrange in advance to carry on his person a card
specifying the conditions under which he will accept treatment).
Nonetheless, it is efficient to presume that the pedestrian consents to
pay, and the law of restitution does just this. 103 The presumption only
extends to services likely to be of high value, though, since the offeree's
high cost of responding could otherwise subject him to all sorts of
unwanted offers from officious if not opportunistic volunteers.
The language of subparagraph (l)(c) that evokes the parties' consent can also be justified in efficiency terms, though of a different sort.
If individual pairs of buyers and sellers have reason to think they will
fall into the group for whom acceptance by silence is preferable, it is of
course efficient to allow them to opt for that regime. But this is simply
an instance of the generic efficiency argument for freedom of contract,
rather than an explanation of the particular doctrine in question.
From the standpoint of efficiency, it is harder to find support in the
model for the strong presumption of both the Restatement and the
common law against interpreting silence as acceptance. This is not to
say, however, that the traditional presumption could not be justified
on some other basis such as distributional fairness or the substantive
right to privacy. Some might view the silent-acceptance rule as unfairly rewarding opportunistic behavior on the part of offerors, to an
extent outweighing any efficiency gains that it could otherwise achieve.
Indeed, if the conclusions of the formal model are to be believed,
the silent-acceptance rule is open to severe objection on just these
grounds. When goods are exchanged under that regime, not only does
the buyer get none of the surplus from the exchange, but he winds up
losing an amount equal to his cost of sending a response. The seller's
ability to force the buyer to expend resources to avoid an unwanted
offer gives her a strategic advantage, with the result that the buyer
103. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); In re Crisan Estate, 362 Mich.
569, 107 N.W.2d 907 (1961).
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actually ends up in a worse position after the exchange than if the offer
had never been made. 104 For this reason, those arrangements in which
parties contract out of the common law rule typically provide some
up-front benefits to the offeree, like the introductory bonuses commonly offered by book clubs. Such loss leaders may be necessary to
induce the offeree to enter into the arrangement at all, since he must be
compensated ex ante for the opportunism he can expect from the offeror ex post.

C. A Variation on the Model: Subjective Intention To Accept
While the foregoing analysis considers only a limited set of strategic choices on the part of the negotiating parties, it can easily be extended to incorporate more complicated situations. To show how this
might be done, it is useful briefly to examine an alternative legal rule,
one that makes the existence of a contract following the buyer's silence
turn on his subjective intention. Such a rule gives the buyer an additional degree of freedom when faced with the seller's offer, and this
alters the strategic structure of the bargaining.
While the trend of modern contract law favors the objective theory
of mutual assent, the earlier subjective tradition remains influential,
both metaphorically (e.g., the "meeting of the minds") and at the level
of concrete doctrine. An instance of this is found in Restatement section 69(l)(b), which on its face actually requires that the offeree subjectively intend to accept at the time of silence in order to enforce the
bargain later.
This subsection of the Restatement has received substantial criticism for its inconsistency with the modern objectivist trend. 105 The
chief problem with it, as with the subjective theory of assent generally,
is a practical one. Determining the offeree's subjective intentions at
the moment of the offer is often severely difficult. If the cost of reliably making this determination is high, a subjective test is unworkable;
the risk is too great that the offeree will want subsequently to misrep104. The sharpness of this conclusion is an artifact of the full-information assumption. In a
more realistic model in which the seller could not be sure of the buyer's reservation price, the
buyer would typically be left with some of the surplus from any trade that occurred. Even with
imperfect information, though, buyers could be worse off under the silent-acceptance rule than if
no offer had issued, while this could never occur under the common law. Furthermore, in all
situations the silent-acceptance rule gives a relative distributional advantage to the seller. For
details, see A. Katz, supra note 81.
105. For instance, Farnsworth calls § 69(l)(b) a "throwback to subjectivism," and elsewhere
remarks:
So fundamental is the tenet that mere silence is not acceptance that, even as master of his
offer, the offeror is powerless to alter the rule.... As it was neatly put by Karl Llewellyn, to
give that effect to invited silence "in a systematics centering on overt manifestations is, one
may suggest, almost lewd." E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 94, at 144, 145.
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resent his intention if he comes to regret the bargain. Under some
circumstances, however, the offeree's intention to accept may be verifiable ex post at reasonably low cost. He may express such an intention
to a third party, or may engage in observable actions such as investing
in reliance or preparing to perform that would not be rational absent
an intention to complete the bargain. As the comments note:
The case for acceptance is strongest when the reliance is definite and
substantial or when the intent to accept is objectively manifested though
not communicated to the offeror . . . . Even though the intent to accept
is manifested only by silent inaction, however, the offeror who has invited such an acceptance cannot complain of the resulting uncertainty in
his position. 106

While the Restatement's commentary speaks largely in terms of
fairness, a formal analysis of the situation's strategic structure demonstrates that a subjective intention rule has allocative consequences as
well. In particular, a subjective rule can be more efficient than either
of the two objective rules already discussed. If the cost of determining
subjective intention is low, an explicit response from the buyer becomes dispensable and the cost of making it can be saved.
The game tree representing the strategies available in a subjectiveintention regime, denoted as Regime III, is depicted in Figure 4. The
sequence of actions is almost the same as under the two previous regimes, but with one important difference - the buyer has four choices
following an offer rather than three. As before, he can still expressly
accept or reject, but now he has two alternatives if he chooses to remain silent: he can silently determine to accept, or silently determine
to reject. The reader should interpret this to mean that the buyer, in
addition to deciding whether to send an explicit response, also chooses
whether to take some action, publicly verifiable ex post but uncommunicated at the time, that entails no additional cost to him so long as
the contract is formed. This private action could be costly if the contract were not enforced, but for the purposes of the discussion, I assume that by taking it the buyer can guarantee himself a deal.
If the buyer expressly responds to the seller's offer, the parties'
payoffs are the same as under the two regimes previously analyzed: (P
- S - C: V - R - P) if he expressly accepts and (-S, -R) if he expressly
rejects. If the buyer remains silent, however, he can effectively choose
by his intention whether or not to be bound. If he intends to accept,
the payoffs following silence are the same as under regime II: the
seller gets (P-S - C), and the buyer gets (V -P). If conversely he
106.

REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS

§ 69 comment c (1981).
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intends to reject, then the payoffs following silence are the same as
under regime I: the seller loses S and the buyer comes out even.

Notation:
V: buyer's valuation of good

C: seller's valuation of good

P: sale price of good
S, R: cost of sending and
receiving messages
Seller

Offer at
price P

No offer

(0,0)

accept

(P-S-C,V-R-P)

reject

(P-S-C,V-P)

(-S, 0)

(-S,-R)

Subjective intention

regime (III)

Figure 4. Subjective interpretation of silence
We again solve for the equilibrium outcome using backward induction, starting with the buyer's reaction to an offer. It should be apparent that under a subjective-intention rule the buyer will never respond
explicitly. Whether he chooses to accept or reject, he can achieve the
same result by silence, and thereby save the cost of a response. His
decision is therefore simplified to choosing between a silent acceptance
or rejection, and he will prefer the former if and only if the price offered by the seller is less than the value V he places on the sale. Foreseeing this, the seller will want to fix the price exactly at V if she
makes an offer. Moreover, she will want actually to make an offer if
and only if this price is enough to cover her combined production and
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communication costs, (C + S). In summary, an exchange at price V
will be offered and accepted if and only if the parties' gross surplus
from exchange, (V - C), exceeds a threshold level equal to the seller's
communication cost, S.
Table 1 compares the equilibrium outcomes of all three legal regimes. It shows that more sales will take place under the subjectiveTable 1: The three acceptance regimes compared
Regime

Sale occurs whenever

Sale price

I (Common law)

V-C>S+R

V-R

II (Silent acceptance)

V-C>S-R

V+R

III (Subjective intent)

V-C>S

v

intention regime III than under regime I, but fewer sales will take
place under regime III than under regime II. This is because the
threshold level of surplus necessary for a sale to take place under regime III lies between the corresponding thresholds for the other two
regimes. Under regime I, that threshold is the sum of seller's and
buyer's communication costs; under regime II, it is the difference between those costs, and under regime III it is the seller's communication cost alone. Furthermore, under the subjective intention rule, the
sale price will be higher than under regime I and lower than under
regime II because the seller always wants to set price equal to the
buyer's net reservation price. Under regime I, the buyer's net reservation price equals the value V he places on the book less his response
cost R. Under regime II, his net reservation price equals the value he
places on the book plus his r~ponse cost. Under regime III, however,
the buyer never needs to respond explicitly to the seller's offer, so his
cost of doing so does not affect his net reservation price - which is
just V. Furthermore, the subjective intention rule, if it is practically
feasible, is strictly more efficient than either of the other rules. To see
this, observe that if gross surplus (V - C) is less than the seller's
message cost S, then regime III yields the same result as regime I: no
sale and no costs incurred. If gross surplus is greater than the seller's
message costs, then regime III yields the same result as regime II: a
sale following one message. Because regime I is more efficient than
regime II when gross surplus is lower than the seller's communication
cost, 107 and regime II is more efficient than regime I when it is higher,
107. More precisely, regimes I and II are equally efficient when gross surplus is less than the
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subjective acceptance combines the best of the other two rules.
The intuition underlying this conclusion is straightforward.
Neither a rule that holds silence always to be acceptance nor a rule
that holds silence never to be acceptance is ideal under all circumstances. The former has the disadvantage of encouraging opportunistic and inefficient offers when the gross surplus from trade is slightly
less than the cost of making an offer. The latter has the disadvantage
of requiring two communications to be sent when one would suffice.
The subjective-intention rule, when feasible, avoids both disadvantages. Under it the buyer can safely ignore the threat of opportunistic
offers by silently rejecting, and can avoid the need· for a redundant
communication by silently accepting.1os
My analysis of the subjective-intention rule of section 69(1)(b), it
must be admitted, rests on some highly special assumptions. Not only
do I assume that the buyer's intention was costlessly verifiable ex post,
but I also implicitly assume that early knowledge of whether the buyer
has in fact accepted is of no particular value to the seller. Under these
assumptions, giving force to the buyer's subjective intention effectively
makes his response costless. In reality, though, a seller given early
notice of acceptance may be able to arrange her affairs to perform at
lower cost, and thus the buyer may be able to exploit the seller's uncertainty to his own advantage. 109 For this reason, this analysis is offered as much to provide an example of how the basic bargaining
model might be varied, as for whatever light it may shed on the allocative effects of this curious doctrinal complication.

D. Comments on the Model
A complete treatment of the acceptance-by-silence doctrine would
take us beyond the scope of the present discussion. Nonetheless, it is
at least worth flagging some of the important strategic considerations
difference between message costs, and regime I is more efficient than regime II when gross surplus is greater than the difference between message costs but less than the seller's message cost.
108. This conclusion can also be viewed as an example of the general tradeoffbetween more
and less centralized contract rules. The subjective-intention rule is relatively decentralized compared to its alternatives - it effectively delegates the decision of which rule should apply to the
offeree, who has superior knowledge of the situation at hand. As a general matter, decentraliza·
tion has the advantage of enabling heterogeneous individuals to minimize transaction costs in
their personal circumstances. It has the associated disadvantage of raising the administrative
costs and likelihood of error for the public authorities charged with enforcement. If public ad·
ministrative costs are relatively low, as when the offeree's intention can be objectively ascertained
ex post, the decentralized rule will be relatively more desirable.
109. The Restatement takes the position that the seller, having voluntarily placed herself in
this position by virtue of inviting the buyer's silence, ought not complain that the resulting uncertainty is unfair. Whether this situation can be faulted on efficiency grounds, however, is a separate question.
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that would arise in a fuller analysis. The foremost among them, in my
view, are the costs of failed exchanges when the parties' reservation
prices are not common knowledge, the uncertainty created when the
offeree's response is delayed, and the possibility that the offeror can act
strategically to influence the offeree's cost of responding. I briefly consider each of these in turn.
One striking feature of the full-information case analyzed in section V.B is that, in equilibrium, no offer is ever rejected. This is because the seller never wants to offer a price above the buyer's
reservation price; since the buyer is sure to reject, she would be better
off saving the cost of an initial communication. In actual markets, of
course, the typical seller makes offers that are rejected by some buyers.
This may be because the seller lacks perfect information about the
buyer's willingness to pay, or because she deals with several buyers
who differ in their reservation prices and is constrained to make the
same offer to all. In either event, the perfect price discrimination implied by the simple model is often not possible.
The full-information· analysis, accordingly, overlooks an important
practical disadvantage of the silent-acceptance regime: under it buyers
have to expend real resources to reject unwanted offers. In a world in
which most offers are rejected, this disadvantage can be substantial
and the common law rule looks more appealing. This is not the end of
the story, however, because acceptance by silence also has a countervailing advantage over the common law, which is not present when
information is perfect. Sellers who find it costly to make offers and
who cannot perfectly price discriminate will typically set their price
above their marginal cost of production. This is most obviously true
for sellers with some degree of monopoly power, but it is also the case
in more competitive markets. 110 Such prices are socially inefficient for
familiar reasons; they inhibit mutually beneficial sales to buyers whose
reservation prices are above marginal cost but below the seller's price.
Acceptance by silence helps counteract this efficiency loss from
supracompetitive pricing, by increasing the likelihood of exchange.
The formal model also does not incorporate the strategic aspects of
delay or of the duration of bargaining. It assumes that the buyer
chooses once and for all whether to accept immediately upon receiving
the offer, whereas in reality that decision takes place over a variable
110. The standard neoclassical model of perfect competition cannot be applied in this setting,
since costly negotiation and communication imply at least some degree of economies of scale.
Once the seller has made her offer to a potential buyer or group of potential buyers, her costs of
doing so are both fixed and sunk. She must therefore charge a price above her average cost of
production in order to break even. For further details, see A. Katz, supra note 81.
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period of time. In many contexts, the buyer's ability to delay his response is an important strategic consideration. By delaying he may
hope to elicit a more favorable offer from an anxious seller. More simply, he may speculate against the offer as an option, waiting to see
whether market conditions or personal circumstances favor going forward with the exchange.
When the offeree's response requires some amount of time, the offeror cannot be sure what inference to draw from the offeree's silence.
Under the strict common law rule, she will be uncertain whether the
offeree has rejected or is merely deliberating. Under the silent-acceptance regime, on the other hand, she will be uncertain whether the offeree is deliberating or has decided to accept by silence. In those
instances when it is uncertain which regime applies she may be completely unable to plan her affairs. Uncertainty is magnified when communication is imperfectly reliable, so that silence can also mean that a
message has gone astray.
·
Most disputes over silent offerees that have actually found their
way into the case law seem to arise out of just this sort of ambiguity.
Offerors are most likely to be confused by silence when the silence is
an extended one, and it is in just this case that the courts have been
most willing to protect them. 111 In my view, these complications cut
both ways. Which regime ultimately is preferable will depend both on
the duration of time involved and on the costs of the resulting uncertainty, which are chiefly those of lost reliance and which may differ
under alternative legal regimes. Nonetheless, a full analysis must take
account of those complications.
Finally, the formal analysis assumed that the parties' costs of communication were exogenously fixed. In reality, buyers and sellers may
have various opportunities to influence these costs, the most important
of which is the seller's option to alter the buyer's cost of responding by
the manner in which she makes the offer. For instance, the seller can
vary the length of time in which to reply, or can specify a more or less
onerous medium of response. Or she might even offer to defray a portion of the response cost through her own expenditures.
The seller has opposite incentives to influence the buyer's response
cost under the two main rules we have considered. Under the common law, she wants to make the buyer's response cost as low as possible, since the lower it is the higher is the buyer's net reservation price,
and the more he is willing to pay for the goods being offered. Accordingly, she will have the incentive to subsidize the r~sponse whenever
111. See the authorities cited supra in notes 85 and 90.
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her resource cost of doing so is less than his. 112 Under the silent-acceptance regime, however, the seller has the incentive to make the
buyer's response cost as high as possible, since the higher it is the more
he is willing to pay for the goods offered. If unchecked, a creatively
opportunistic seller might send the offer in such cover that the buyer is
unlikely to discover it, give the buyer an unreasonably short time to
reply, or require burdensome efforts to order to reject.113
For this reason, even a legal regime that recognized silence as a
valid form of acceptance would have to place some limits on the procedural terms of the seller's offer, in order to prevent the more extravagant versions of opportunism. 114 Such limits could not entirely
eliminate the seller's motive to behave this way, though, and certainly
could not provide the positive incentives to minimize communication
costs that the common law does. As a result, the total costs of communication would in most instances be higher under a silent-acceptance rule.
Accordingly, the formal model probably underestimates the importance of offeror opportunism as an explanation for the common
law rule. When significant, this risk can supply an efficiency argument
for the offeree's right to be let alone, supplementing the language of
fairness and reciprocity in which the right is ordinarily defended by its
proponents. Indeed, this may be the strongest defense that can be offered for the common law rule.
VI.

AN IMPERFECT INFORMATION MODEL: STANDARDIZED
FORM CONTRACTS

Readers inclined to question the relevance of representing a complex reality with stylized models will no doubt consider the foregoing
discussion and its assumption that the bargainers have full information
112. A mundane illustration of this is provided by the common practice among direct-mail
marketers of including self-addressed envelopes in their circulars. It is almost certainly cheaper
for the offerer to mass-produce and mail an envelope with her own address on it than it is for the
offeree to take the time to find and address one specially. Prepaid postage, in contrast, is less
widespread though still common. Given the current postal rates for business mail, it may be no
cheaper for the offerer to prepay the postage, unless one counts the time cost to the offeree of
rooting around in his desk drawer for a stamp. Unless the offerer has some cost advantage over
the offeree in communication, there is no point to her arranging to subsidize his response.
113. As an extreme example, by providing that the offer will be deemed accepted unless the
buyer takes out a full page advertisement to the contrary in the business section of a national
newspaper.
114. In addition to Restatement § 69(l)(a)'s requirement that the offeree have reasonable
opportunity to reject before being bound, for example, 16 C.F.R. § 425.1 (1990) (Federal Trade
Commission regulation requiring an operator of a negative-option plan clearly to disclose the
plan's material terms, and requiring that subscribers be given at least ten days in which to instruct the seller not to mail the offered merchandise).
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overly simplistic. The main purpose of the current section, therefore,
is to show how more realistic analyses might be constructed and to
take some steps in that direction. This Part also illustrates the potential fragility of the game-theoretic approach - how a given set of predictions can depend sensitively on a particular description of the
bargaining process. The exercise demonstrates that one should be
wary of strong assertions in this area until substantial and detailed
effort is devoted to studying the strategic structure of bargaining.
The substantive topic I discuss is the interpretation of fine-print
terms in form contracts. As has long been recognized, in a mass-production economy the costs of individual negotiation are high and the
terms of exchange need to be standardized in some fashion. Consequently, many who participate regularly in the market find it worthwhile to develop stereotypical printed forms which set out the terms
upon which the drafter proposes to do business. This enables these
participants to exploit scale economies in determining the provisions
that maximize their surplus from the transaction, and in drafting the
written agreement that embodies those provisions.
If standard forms are actually to economize on the costs of negotiation, each individual exchange cannot provide an occasion for reopening every term of the bargain. The fact that some terms are not
negotiable, on the other hand, does not mean no bargaining occurs.
Typical forms leave blank space to be :filled with the essential terms
that are actually dickered - usually price, quantity, and the date of
shipment or delivery- with the rest largely regarded as "boilerplate."
In general, one would expect the parties to adjust the negotiable terms
in individual transactions depending on how the nonnegotiable terms
affected their individual circumstances.
If both parties to the exchange completely understood the standard
forms and also bore the full costs of negotiation, one might suppose
they would use form contracts whenever the savings in negotiation
costs outweighed the countervailing advantages of tailoring the exchange to their individual needs. Contracting parties, however, often
purport to accept form offers without knowing or understanding the
terms within. This is individually rational of them because the cost of
considering each term is not trivial and many terms deal with the consequences of improbable contingencies. Additionally, the terms are
often written in fine print to economize on paper and handling, and
expressed obscurely or in legal or technical jargon, which raises the
cost of becoming acquainted with them even further.
In this setting, contract bargaining would most appropriately be
modeled as a game of imperfect information. The uncertainty is pri-
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marily on the offeree's part, however; because the seller drafts the
form (or at least chooses among several standard forms), he presumably has a clearer idea of its provisions. Moreover, imperfect information is not the same as no information at all; although buyers cannot
know without reading what particular terms an individual seller has
inserted into an offer, they may develop over time a reasonably reliable
sense of what sorts of terms typically will be encountered in the market at large.
As I suggested earlier, imperfect information models are substantially more intricate than full-information models, and a variety of
technical issues arise in their analysis. Accordingly, I gloss over a
number of details and complexities in the argument here, since a more
rigorous explanation would substantially detract from the exposition.
Fortunately, much of the heuristic argument can be simplified without
substantial distortion. For a rigorous presentation of the model, however, I refer the reader to a technical companion paper containing the
formal proofs. 115
A.

The Doctrinal Background

Despite their evident advantages, form contracts have been received by courts and by legal commentators with ambivalence and, on
occasion, with suspicion. 116 In part, this arises from the association
some lawyers have drawn between such contracts and the alleged presence of market power. 117 The law's ambivalence toward form contracts, however, goes beyond a party's inability to negotiate all terms
individually with the offeror. The law also faces a theoretical difficulty
in finding the requisite mutual assent: on first blush it would seem
that a person simply cannot freely agree to be bound by an obligation
without knowing what she is agreeing to. Several solutions have been
suggested to this problem. Each of them depends to a greater or lesser
extent on using a fiction; each results in a different rule of
interpretation.
115. See Katz, Your Terms or Mine: The Duty To Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 24 RAND
518 (1990).
116. See, e.g., Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Rakolf, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay In Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1174 (1983); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control ofLawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1971).
117. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161A.2d69 (1960); Kessler, supra note 116, at 632 ("The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not
in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract
has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger
party .•••").
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One possible explanation is that in accepting a standardized form
offer, the buyer agrees to delegate her authority to the seller to set
whatever nondickered terms he pleases, subject to the broad limits imposed by doctrines such as fraud and unconscionability. 118 The typical doctrinal shorthand for this view is that the buyer has a "duty to
read" the contract; if she neglects this duty she waives her objection to
the consequcnces. 119 The "duty to read" is often identified as the position of the common law at the beginning of this century, though its
harshness was undoubtedly mitigated by the effect of other doctrines.
An obvious advantage of this rule is its relative ease of administration,
since under it one need merely consult a contract's written provisions
to determine its content.120
A less extreme version of this position, associated with the later
views of Karl Llewellyn and endorsed by the Second Restatement, is
that the buyer assents to the standardized terms of a form offer on the
understanding that the terms are the same as those regularly accepted
by others in similar situations. On this view, the law imposes customary limits on the seller's discretion in order to guarantee the buyer
equal treatment vis-a-vis other buyers. Among these limits are the incorporation of trade usage and course of dealing into the contract; the
implied duty of good faith, which imposes standards of honesty in fact
and commercial reasonableness; and the fuzzy constraints of the unconscionability doctrine, which protect the buyer against unusually
oppressive terms. 121 This approach results in greater administrative
difficulty, for courts interpreting standard forms must determine the
initially uncertain dictates of custom, good faith, and the like. Over
the long run, however, as courts decide a variety of disputes, these
criteria are likely to become more clearly understood.
A third approach would be to interpret the form contract, where
possible, as containing the set of nondickered terms that is most in the
buyer's interest. Support for this can be found in the authorities that
118. As in the previous Part, I will speak as if the seller is the otreror, with no loss of
generality.
119. See, e.g., Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonneborn, 245 Md. 213, 221, 225 A.2d 470 (1965)
("the law presumes that a person knows the contents of a document that he executes and understands at least the literal meaning of its terms"); National Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 81
Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973).
120. The administrative advantages of the duty to read have often been exaggerated, since
the written terms of any contract contain ambiguities that are difficult to resolve without reference to the larger context of the parties' bargain. Proponents of a strict duty to read, accordingly, have tended to combine that position with support for one of a variety of formalistic
interpretative doctrines, such as the so-called "plain meaning'' or "four comers" rules.
121. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACI'S § 211(1) (1981) and comments thereto.
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endorse construing contracts against the drafter. 122 One might also
describe this as implying a "duty to speak" on the part of the drafter,
who risks being bound unfavorably if he does not somehow bring the
content of the standardized terms to the consumer's attention. Proponents of this view argue that the seller knows both that the consumer
will not read and that it is not reasonable for her to read, and that the
seller, as creator of the terms, is in a position to bring them to the
buyer's attention easily and cheaply.123
Finally, a fourth approach would be to reject mutual assent altogether as the basis for enforcing standardized terms. On this view, the
buyer assents only to the basic terms of exchange that she actually
learns of. With regard to the other provisions, the parties have failed
to reach agreement and the law should treat this just as if the parties
had left the term open: by implying a term that is fair or reasonable
under the circumstances. 124 This last rationale resembles the approach of Llewellyn and of Restatement section 206 in its references to
custom and reasonable dealing. Its distinctive feature, however, is that
it justifies enforcing implied terms by regulatory authority rather than
by the parties' presumed intention. 125 For this reason, a court applying this rationale might consider itself justified in departing substantially from the parties' likely wishes in order to reach a socially
desirable result. In the extreme, this view could justify dispensing entirely with freedom of contract and simply requiring a particular set of
terms that the parties would not be free to negotiate around even if
they bargained explicitly. This would at least provide some of the benefits of standardization, albeit on a centralized rather than decentralized basis. While mandatory terms have obvious costs when the
population of buyers and sellers is heterogeneous, they do save on the
costs of negotiations.126
122. See, e.g., REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 206 (1981).
123. See, e.g., Rakoft', supra note 116.
124. Cf REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 204 (1981): "When the parties to a
bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is
essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."
125. This argument is advanced, for instance, by Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract:
The Transformation of Contract Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pl1T. L. REV. 21 (1984).
126. Modem American contract law is influenced by all these approaches. The traditional
duty to read, however, has come under increasing attack in recent years, both by commentators
and courts. Parties who accept without reading may escape being bound in a variety of circumstances; for instance, when the standardized form is illegible or printed in extremely small type, if
the drafter has used a document, such as a claim check, that is not expected to contain contractual terms, or if the drafter misrepresents or fails to correct the other party's obvious misunderstanding of the writing. Courts now widely accept Llewellyn's argument that signing a contract
does not by itself imply assent to surprising or unusual terms, and commonly limit such terms by
construing ambiguous language against the drafter. Furthermore, courts have also been increas-
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From a policy perspective, the question of what effect to give the
terms of a standardized agreement can also usefully be viewed as a
problem of economic efficiency. In situations where communication is
costly, some standardization is desirable, but creates offsetting inefficiencies when contracting parties are heterogeneous. Can we obtain
some of the benefits of decentralization by letting the drafter fix terms
unilaterally, or would we do better to put limits on this discretion?
Given the obvious benefits of standardization, which rule best balances
the goals of saving on negotiation costs and choosing the terms best
suited to the individual circumstances?
B. Baird and Weisberg's Defense of the Duty To Read

,
I take as a starting point a recent provocative article by Douglas
Baird and Robert Weisberg, which addresses these very questions. 127
To be accurate, they actually discuss a more complicated problem the so-called "battle of the forms," which arises when both parties to a
transaction use standardized but inconsistent forms, and it is necessary
to decide which will prevail. 128 Baird and Weisberg argue that the
most efficient policy is a formal and d~ntralized rule that defers to
the language of the later form.
Traditional American common law arguably provided such a rule
- the so-called "mirror image rule." Its theoretical rationale was that
a responding form could not be an acceptance unless it mirrored the
offeror's form in all particulars. A later inconsistent form could therefore only be interpreted as a rejection, and hence a counter offer. If
the parties attempted to go ahead with the deal notwithstanding the
ingly willing to interfere with standardized terms on external substantive grounds such as unconscionability and good faith, since they view the freedom of contract considerations that ordinarily
impede such external doctrines as largely absent in the form-contract setting. See, e.g., Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
In addition, statutory developments have substantially cut back on the traditional duty to
read. The Uniform Commercial Code imposes a duty to speak with respect to a variety of contract terms including warranties of merchantability and fitness, and implies an obligation of good
faith in the performance and enforcement of every contract within its scope. U.C.C. § 2-316
(1977) ("Exclusion or Modification of Warranties"); § 1-203 ("Obligation of Good Faith").
Other state and federal statutes and administrative regulations specifically directed toward con·
sumers create similar obligations. See, e.g., the Magnuson·Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1988), and associated FrC regulations at 16 C.F.R §§ 701-703 (1990); and vari·
ous sections of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
127. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 5.
128. Inconsistency between the forms can also give rise to another sort of dispute, in which
one party tries to renege on the deal before performance, arguing that no contract was ever
formed. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
Few disputes of this sort, however, have been reported in recent years, probably because § 2207(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code makes it clear that a contract exists whenever there has
been a "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance."
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inconsistency, their doing so would be taken as an acceptance by conduct of the offer contained in the later form, which then governed the
bargain.
The mirror image rule has been supplanted at least in sales cases
by section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. While the interpretation of section 2-207 has been the subject of considerable controversy, the most widely influential view is that section 2-207 directs
courts to ignore the forms when they conflict, and instead to apply the
default or "off-the-rack" terms ofU.C.C. Article 2 to fill in any resulting gaps. Such default terms for the most part invoke contextual standards such as reasonableness, custom, or trade usage.129
Baird and Weisberg accept this majority interpretation of section
2-207. They argue, however, that the resulting rule is substantially
less efficient than the mirror image rule. This is the case, in their view,
because the off-the-rack standards are burdensome for courts to apply,
and because they impose substantial costs on buyers and sellers whose
circumstances do not fit the standard mold. In contrast, the mirror
image rule makes it easier for individual parties to choose terms best
suited to their particular situation.
The key to Baird and Weisberg's thesis is their claim that the mirror image rule promotes efficiency in negotiation. They acknowledge
that the prospect of firing the last shot may encourage parties to insert
inefficient but unilaterally advantageous terms into their forms. They
argue, however, that a rule giving legal effect to standardized forms
will induce some parties to read those forms, and that the prospect
that some parties will read will induce the drafter to moderate his
terms. Additionally, the buyer's knowledge that a form contains onesided terms will reduce her willingness to enter into the deal and the
price she is willing to pay, further reducing the gain from opportunistic drafting:
[T]he mirror image rule, compared to other possible approaches, takes
maximum advantage of these market forces. It makes printed forms
matter more by encouraging or even forcing parties receiving documents
to read them more carefully. The rule thereby encourages parties sending documents to make them attractive to their intended recipients ....
[T]he seller that does not moderate its self-interest in drafting its
forms will lose the opportunity to deal with at least some buyers on the
129. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-305 (price); § 2-306 (quantity); § 2-308 (place of delivery); § 2-309
(time of payment). I am deliberately glossing over the particulars of the debate over § 2-207,
since they are incidental to my purpose. For an excellent discussion of the section that also
provides practical guidance for contracting parties, see generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 1-3 (3d ed. 1988).
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terms in that form. Its rational self-interest will therefore be to design
the terms in its form in the mutual interest of the parties.
Under the mirror image rule, then, each party, in designing its form
for a particular type of transaction, has an incentive to hypothesize the
terms that the parties would have settled upon had they dickered over
them. 130

Under the U.C.C., they argue in contrast, a seller contemplating sending a one-sided form will have no incentive at all to moderate his
terms, since there is no penalty for not doing so and a possibility that
the off-the-rack terms will support the one-sided terms. 131
The logic of the Baird-Weisberg argument, if valid, ought to carry
over in straightforward fashion to those simpler exchanges in which
only one party uses a standardized form. 132 If Baird and Weisberg are
correct in their characterization of form-contract bargaining, then
modem doctrines that limit the drafter's control over contract terms
also eliminate the parties' incentives to negotiate optimal terms. It
would follow that the modem trend away from the duty to read is
misplaced from the standpoint of efficiency.
Baird and Weisberg's claim has some heuristic appeal in its resemblance to familiar economic arguments that sellers will be led by their
desire to maximize profit to offer optimal contract terms or product
attributes. Unfortunately, their claim is not well-grounded in any precise account of the bargaining process, and as a result the recipient's
incentives to expend resources reading form contracts are obscured.
Instead, Baird and Weisberg simply assert that it will be in the interest
of a significant minority of recipients to read the forms sent to them
before deciding whether to accept. Their entire defense of this assumption is the following:
Merchants, however, probably do look for, and pay attention to,
preprinted terms that may prove important in the transaction, including
terms, such as warranty disclaimers, that turn up so frequently as the
subjects of reported battle of the forms litigation. [Footnote:] The only
recent empirical study of which the authors are aware was made in England, where the mirror image rule appears to survive. . . . That study
suggests that parties read at least the more important of the fine-print
terms, such as warranty disclaimers. Based on a survey of only 19 engineering manufacturers, the study must be regarded as merely
130. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 5, at 1255, 1257 (emphasis in original).
131. Baird and Weisberg also address objections that the mirror image rule would encourage
an endless battle of the forms as each party tried to fire the last shot, and that the rule unfairly
allows parties to renege on deals before performance. Id. at 1252-53.
132. Their analysis would fail in this context only if the opposing party's opportunity to send
her own standardized form in response exerted an independent restraint on the drafter's discretion. While Baird and Weisberg mention this possibility incidentally, it does not play a central
role in their argument. Id. at 1257.
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suggestive. 133
While this empirical claim is hardly compelling (Macauley's wellknown and earlier findings to the contrary being at least as persuasive), 134 an equally serious problem is that good theoretical reason exists to doubt that the number of recipients who actually read forms
will be sufficient to encourage drafters to provide efficient terms. For
one matter, Baird and Weisberg ignore the incentive for recipients to
free ride. Since reading and understanding forms is costly, and since
the benefits of efficient terms are enjoyed by the population as a whole,
individual recipients might rationally sit back in the hope that others
will keep the drafters honest. Similarly, no individual recipient would
spend resources on reading if she believed that all drafters were using
roughly comparable terms. At least some drafters would have to be
using suboptimal terms else nothing would be learned by reading.13s
To be fair, Baird and Weisberg would probably respond that their
claim regarding the duty to read is not that all drafters would be induced by the threat of detection to include optimal terms; merely that
most would, or that at least most would be induced to include terms
that are not so suboptimal as to outweigh the inefficiency of centrally
mandated terms. But even this weaker claim turns out to be problematic upon more careful inspection. In fact, the formal model I am
about to present suggests that reading standardized contracts may not
be rational at all. 136
Before presenting the formal model, I want to be precise about the
claim I am making with it. I am not saying that the drafters of form
contracts have no economic incentives whatsoever to avoid self-serving contractual provisions - merely that the threat that buyers will
read is not one of them. In many though not all instances, such an
incentive is provided by the drafter's desire to maintain a good commercial reputation, since customers surprised ex post by oppressive
133. Id. at 1253 & n.87 (citing Beale & Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning
and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J. L. & SOCY. 45, 50 (1975)) (citation omitted).
134. Macauley, supra note 25.
135. Cf Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Re·
search. 60 N.Y.U. L. R.Bv. 761 (1985) (explaining similar argument against pure version of the
efficient market hypothesis in financial economics).
136. The argument can be taken as an extension of the well·known analysis of markets with
asymmetric information by Akerlof, The Market for ''Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 488, 488-500 (1970). As Akerlof and others have argued,
market equilibrium is inefficient when no institution provides information about individual attributes of heterogeneous buyers and sellers. One particular institution that has been widely
suggested to serve this purpose is the warranty contract. Warranties and analogous promises can
only provide a solution to the lemons problem and other types of adverse selection, however, if
individuals find it in their interests to learn about the terms of exchange. The model shows that
they may lack incentive to do so when co=unication is costly.
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fine-print terms are unlikely to furnish either repeat or referral business in the future. For several related reasons, however, I do not consider reputation or goodwill in the following discussion, assuming
them to be insufficient to induce the seller to provide the optimal contract terms.
In the first place, I want to focus my attention on Baird and Weisberg's primary justification for the duty to read: that it encourages
efficient drafting by establishing a credible threat that buyers will read
the fine print. While they also argue that reputational considerations
help to encourage efficient commercial behavior, I think this plays
only a secondary role in their specific defense of the doctrine. Rather,
the reputational contention is offered more to support their overall argument for private freedom of contract over centralized regulation.
Second, legal rules for interpreting contracts matter primarily
when the effects of reputation are weak. In those situations in which
the desire for future business is sufficient to induce the seller to provide
efficient terms, it will often also induce the parties to settle any disputes between them without consulting the law, since the private sanctions resulting from the lost relationship will overshadow any official
remedy available. On the other hand, if exchange is largely anonymous, or if the parties transact business only discretely and infrequently, or if for whatever reason (for instance, impending
bankruptcy) the drafter is concerned largely with the short term, the
extent to which buyers read the fine print and the consequences the
law attaches to it become important.
Third, even if legal sanctions are important to the drafting party,
his concern for reputation is likely to take the form of waiving or declining to enforce one-sided terms ex post, rather than excluding them
from the written contract ex ante. Having the tern:is in the writing
gives a seller the discretion to invest in goodwill in circumstances
where it is most valuable to do so, while leaving him the option of
enforcing the contract to the letter at other times. This flexibility can
be especially vital for the many provisions that deal with the consequences of improbable contingencies, since the contingency's actual
occurrence may mean that circumstances have substantially changed.
Furthermore, the goodwill that comes from waiver ex post may be a
more valuable kind, because insisting on less than one's demonstrable
legal rights has particular salience. In contrast, a seller may reap little
credit for offering a proconsumer standard form that no one ever
reads.
The fourth and final reason stems from my methodological program. A seller's concern for reputation should be understood from a
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game-theoretic perspective as a rational response to repeated strategic
interaction with buyers. 137 Nevertheless, understanding the parties'
incentives in the one-shot interaction is an essential prerequisite to understanding their incentives in the more complicated repeated case.
Developing a reputation for reasonable contract terms would be unnecessary, for instance, if all buyers read the fine print, and would be
impossible if they took no interest in the fine print at all.
Accordingly, the formal model below focuses on the essential features of the form-contract problem: an efficiency cost from suboptimally chosen contract terms, so that negotiation can realize some
gain; a positive cost associated with reading others' form contracts or
explaining one's forms to others, so that explicit negotiation is best
avoided if possible; and the presence of heterogeneous buyers and sellers in the market, so that a social planner setting the required terms
cannot achieve the optimal social outcome in every case. As in the
previous Part, I ignore the costs of contract enforcement. I also assume away the possibility of counteroffers or other related communications (and in the form contract setting the take-it-or-leave-it
assumption may seem more plausible). Even this minimalist account,
however, will show Baird and Weisberg's story to be incomplete.
C. A Formal Model of the Duty To Read
As before, we start with the strategic structure - the parties' potential strategies and the relevant sequence of events - which is depicted in the game tree of Figure 5. I continue to suppose that the
transaction involves the sale of a fixed quantity of some good, and that
the bargaining involves a single seller and a single buyer, who may be
drawn from a population of various types. 138 The seller initially offers
an exchange to the buyer, which may or may not be in standardized
form.
For simplicity, I will assume only two terms in the offer: price and
quality. In reality, of course, any standardized offer will include terms
of two sorts: some ascertainable on their face, and some that are ascertainable only with a positive cost. I refer to these as patent and
latent terms. Price should be interpreted as standing for all patent
terms, and quality as standing for all latent terms. The contract's
137. See, e.g., Kreps & Wilson, supra note 63; Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 63.
138. Alternatively, the model may be interpreted to apply to a seller who simultaneously
makes an offer to an entire population of buyers. In one interpretation, the buyer's characteristics are a random variable drawn from the possible distribution of types in the population at
large; in the other, the seller deals with all types of buyers at once in proportion to their frequency in the population. Nothing turns on which interpretation one selects.
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quality may include factors such as the extent of any warranty, the
extent of seller's freedom to cancel the contract in unforeseen circumstances, and the like. Price is denoted by the letter P, and quality is
denoted by the letter X. It may be helpful to think of quality as varying along a single dimension, such as a warranty clause that could
range from "as is" to an unconditional guarantee, although this is inessential to the analysis. The analysis would follow along analogous
lines with multiple dimensions of patent and latent terms. The seller
may, if he wishes, spend the resources necessary to make quality as
well as price costlessly ascertainable. He may do this by going to the
trouble of bringing all relevant terms to the buyer's attention, or perhaps by promising to reimburse the buyer for any expenses she incurs
in evaluating the offer. Such an attempt will of course raise the seller's
marketing costs. The amount the seller must spend to reveal quality
to the buyer, denoted as S, must be incurred independently of whether
the buyer accepts the offer. The cost of making a form offer is assumed to be zero.
If the seller goes to the effort of making all terms patent, the buyer
then decides, based on both price and quality, whether she wants to
accept or reject. If the seller does not go to this effort, then the quality
term will remain latent and the buyer will then have to decide, in light
of the price and her expectations regarding the probable quality the
offer is likely to contain, whether to inspect it more carefully. I refer
to this process of inspection as "reading," although it may also include
expenses such as consulting an attorney to determine the meaning of
technical language. Reading the contract requires the buyer to expend
a positive amount I denote as R, which must be incurred whether or
not she purchases.139
If the buyer does not read, she must decide whether to accept or
reject the offer on the basis of the price alone, combined with her expectations about the contents of fine print. I' assume that these expectations are rational in the Bayesian sense discussed earlier; in other
words, they roughly correspond to the actual frequencies of the terms
that sellers choose to offer in equilibrium. Conversely, if she does read

139. The cost of reading should be understood as the net cost after subtracting out any entertainment value (probably an empirically unimportant consideration); I assume no one so enjoys reading standardized forms that they would actually choose to do so apart from evaluating
the proposed exchange. I am going to ignore the prospect that the buyer can choose to spend a
variable amount reading the contract, with more effort yielding better information. This does not
make any difference to the argument. Similarly, the cost of reading could vary among buyers
without affecting the argument, so long as it were positive for all except a trivial fraction of them.
See Katz, supra note 115.
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Notation:
V(X): buyer's value for good of quality X
E[V(X)): buyer's expected value for good of uncertain X
C(X): seller's cost for good quality X
P: sale price of good
S: seller's cost of sending individual offer
R: buyer's cost of reading form offer

Seller

(P-C(X), E[V(X)]-P)

Buyer

(P-C(X)-S, V(X)-P)

(0,0)

reject

(P-C(X), V(X)-P-R)

(0,-R)

Figure 5. Form-contract bargaining under a duty to read

(-S,O)
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the form and learns the quality it specifies, she can then decide
whether to accept oi reject on a fully informed basis.
The seller's production cost depends positively on the level of quality promised, so he would like to have that term as low as possible for
any given price and quantity of sales. The buyer's willingness to pay,
on the other hand, depends positively on quality and she would like to
have it as high as possible, other things remaining equal. I refer to the
seller's cost as C(X) and the buyer's reservation price as V(X), where
the notation is intended to represent the dependence of price on quality. Of course, the buyer will be willing to pay a higher price for a
good of higher quality only if she knows or has reason to believe it
actually is of higher quality. If the offer is a standard form and the
buyer does not read it, the price she is willing to pay depends on the
goad's expected quality. In this case her reservation price is denoted
as E[V(X)].
The extent to which reservation price rises with quality may vary
among individual buyers. For the sake of exposition, however, I initially assume that all buyers are equally quality-sensitive; relaxing this
assumption, which I will do later, 140 makes no fundamental difference
to the problem. The extent to which cost rises with quality similarly
can vary among sellers. I do assume that a buyer's willingness to pay
for quality has diminishing returns, so that successive increases in
quality produce successively smaller increases in her valuation. Similarly, the seller faces increasing costs, so that successive increases in
quality produce successively larger increases in production cost.
These last two assumptions imply that a uniquely efficient level of
quality exists, which maximizes the potential gross surplus V(X) C(X) from exchange, for any particular buyer-seller pair. Under full
information, if Coasian bargaining were possible, the parties would do
best to set the quality level where the buyer's willingness to pay for an
incremental increase in quality exactly equaled the seller's cost of providing it. I denote this efficient level as X~ and denote the valuation
and cost when quality is efficiently chosen as V* and C*.
A description of the parties' payoffs for each possible configuration
of actions completes the specification of the bargaining. Start with the
situation, illustrated on the right-hand branch of Figure 5, where the
seller notifies the buyer of both price and quality. If the buyer accepts,
the seller nets (P- C(X) - S) (price less production and selling costs),
and the buyer nets (V{X) - P) (valuation less price). If the buyer rejects, the seller loses S, since selling cost is sunk whether or not a sale
140. See text accompanying note 146 i'nfra.
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occurs, and the buyer comes out even. If the seller sends a form offer,
as depicted on the. left-hand branch of Figure 5, four distinct possible
outcomes arise. The buyer can reject before reading, in which case
neither party gafus or loses anything. The buyer can read and then
reject, in which case the seller nets zero and the buyer loses R, the cost
of reading. The buyer can read and then accept, in which case the
seller nets (P - C(X)) and the buyer nets (V(X) - P - R). Or finally,
the buyer can accept without reading at all, in which case the seller
nets (P- C(X}}, and the buyer's position is an uncertain one. She does
not know at the time she accepts what quality she will get. Her best
guess, however, is that she will get the average level of quality available in the market; she has no reason to think this seller's quality is
any better or worse than average. Accordingly, if she buys without
reading, she expects to net (E[V(X)]- P) - the value she attaches to a
good of average quality, less the price.
We may now solve this bargaining game. Since the game is one of
imperfect information, the method of backwards induction used in the
previous Part does not apply. The method of solution, however, is
closely analogous. Consider the alternatives of individual and form
offers in turn.
If the seller presents the buyer with an individualized offer, he will
have incentive to provide the efficient level of quality. The argument
for this is as follows: for any quality level, a fully informed buyer will
accept if and only if her valuation V(X) exceeds or equals the price P.
Hence the seller should set price just equal to V(X), earning a return of
V(X) - C(X) - S. This return differs from the gross surplus only by the
constant selling cost S. Since selling cost does not vary with the quality of the good, the seller can maximize his return by maximizing the
gross surplus - that is, by choosing the efficient level of quality X*.
The explanation for this result is that since the seller gets to make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer, he captures the entire surplus from the exchange. Hence, it is in his interest to maximize that surplus.
The case in which the seller makes a standardized form offer is
more complicated. Nonetheless, it follows from the strategic structure
that the buyer Win not read the offer and the seller will choose the
lowest possible quality level. A proof by contradiction prpvides the
easiest way to see this. Assume arguendo that buyers sometimes decide to read forms when presented with a given price of P, and I will
show why this cannot be an equilibrium. 141 The only reason they
141. The buyer's decision whether to read could in principle be conditioned on the price or
other patent terms. As I argue momentarily, however, this possibility makes no difference to the
buyer's optimal strategy, so I treat price as fixed in the discussion.
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would read, let us recall, is if sellers provided different quality levels in
their forms. If all sellers behaved identically, in equilibrium ·buyers
would realize nothing can be learned by reading.142 ·
Consider the quality level that a seller would specify in a form offer
under these circumstances. The seller takes the proportion of buyers
who read as given, because the choice of a single seller is not going to
alter the buyer's beliefs about the frequency of contract terms to be
encountered in the market. 143 Furthermore, he need only concern
himself with the reaction of the buyers who read; because the rest
never learn about the actual quality offered until it is too late and are
insensitive to it in their purchasing decision.
For any given price, however, any informed buyer requires some
minimal level of quality in order to accept the offer, which I call the
reservation quality level The reservation qualify level for any offer is
just that amount of quality necessary to provide the buyer with a valuation equal to the price being asked, and make her barely willing to
accept. The lower the price, the lower is the reservation quality level.
I denote this level as X(P}, where the notation is intended to represent
the fact that reservation quality depends on price. ·
Consequently, a maximizing seller would never want to choose
above X(P). To do otherwise would unnecessarily sacrifice profits, because a decrease from any higher quality would reduce costs and sacrifice no sales. But, since reservation quality is just that level where the
informed buyer's valuation exactly equals the price, she gains no surplus from exchange. Instead, a buyer who reads must therefore wind
up with a net loss of R - the costs spent becoming fuformed - if the
seller is maximizing. Such a buyer could have done better than this (in
fact, could have lost nothing) by simply rejeeting the offer out of hand.
In other words, the buyer would have been better off not reading in the
first place. Yet this contradicts the assumption that reading was a rational strategy for her, and implies that buyers cannot read in
equilibrium.
:
If buyers fail to read the fine print, sellers .wri~ing standardized
forms have every incentive to choose the quality level as low as possible (recall that reputation is excluded from the .model). The specific
.
"
142. Formally, in this case E[V(X)j = V(X), so that a rejecting-out-of-hand strategy plainly
dominates a reject-after-reading strategy, and accepting without reading dominates accepting
after reading. The point can be generalized. If information is costly, the only reason to gather it
aside from direct consumption value is to inform some decision to be taken afterwards. If one
expects to act the same way whatever one learns, then it is better to save the resources and just
take the action.
143. Because of the sequential structure of the game, sellers cannot commit to any particular
distribution of quality before buyers decide whether to read.
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quality provided would be constrained either by technical considerations, or by whatever other legal doctrines the courts would apply to
protect a nonreading buyer. Denote this minimum quality level as X<>
and the seller cost and buyer valuation associated with it as C0 and Vr>
Since buyers can anticipate that all sellers in equilibrium using form
offers will choose minimum quality, the most that they will be willing
to pay is V0• This is the price, therefore, that sellers will offer when
they use standardized forms.
Now a seller can earn at most (V0 - Co) from a form offer, and we
already saw that he could earn (V* - C* - S) by making an individual
offer. The difference between consumer valuation and production cost
is at least as large (and generally larger) when quality is set optimally
than when it is set minimally. It follows that the seller will choose to
make an individual rather than a form offer only when the increased
revenues from doing so, (V* - C*) - (V0 - Co), exceed the cost S of
making the latent terms patent. Since sellers will vary in the costs
they face in doing this, they will prefer to make individual offers when
their marketing costs are low, and will prefer form offers when their
marketing costs are high. This completes the derivation of the
equilibrium.
To summarize the analysis: Under a legal regime that places the
duty to read form contracts on the buyer, reading contracts is not a
rational strategy for buyers in equilibrium. As a result, providing any
quality above the minimum possible level is not a rational strategy for
sellers who use form contracts in equilibrium. This does not mean
that no quality above the minimum possible level will ever be provided
under a duty to read. On the contrary, since buyers are willing to pay
a higher price for increased quality once it is brought to their attention, it may well be in sellers' interests to provide the efficient level of
quality and to alert buyers to the fact that they have done so. 144 But
this will only occur if sellers bear the cost and effort of making the
quality terms of the offer patent.
The intuition underlying this perhaps surprising result stems from
the specific sequential structure of the bargaining. In particular, it
arises from the quite ordinary fact that buyers must decide whether to
spend resources reading a standardized form before they know what
latent terms it contains - and that sellers have the motive to take
advantage of this, and no means to commit themselves not to. Because the costs of becoming informed are sunk once incurred, a buyer
144. Or, if there are multiple aspects of quality, the seller may wish to go to the trouble to
communicate some of them to the buyer but not others, depending on the cost of doing so
credibly.
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can wind up in a situation where, having been informed, she just
barely wants to accept, while wishing that she had not bothered to
become informed in the first place. Indeed, if she did read, the seller's
optimal strategy would be to place her in precisely this situation.145
Since she can anticipate this turn of events, she prefers not to read
instead of reading just to get into the position of taking a barely acceptable deal.
I have so far assumed that all buyers attach the same valuation to
quality, and that sellers know these valuations when they set the contract terms. If some buyers were more sensitive to quality than others,
one might surmise that the relatively sensitive buyers would read form
contracts even if the less sensitive do not. Furthermore, when buyers
are heterogeneous, sellers could not be assured of setting price or quality exactly at the buyer's reservation level, and would want to offer a
price that low-valuation buyers would reject, in order to get a higher
price from high-valuation buyers. Accordingly, the precise line of argument I used above to show that buyers will not read must be
modified.
Relaxing the assumption that buyers identically value quality,
however, does not make any difference to the basic argument. For a
rigorous explanation why this is so, I refer the interested reader to the
technical companion paper. 146 The nature of the reasoning, however,
can be easily outlined. Again, the proof is by contradiction. SU;ppose
that some buyers, possibly with differing valuations of quality, choose
to become informed. Of this group there must be one whose reservation quality level is highest (or at least as high as anyone else's); call
her the most discriminating buyer. Clearly, a profit-maximizing seller
should set quality no higher than the reservation level of the most discriminating buyer. But then that buyer winds up worse off than if she
had just rejected the offer out of hand (just as all informed buyers did
in the simpler story that assumed all of them equally discriminating).
She therefore decides not to read, and drops out of the group of informed buyers. We can then find a most discriminating buyer among
those remaining, and repeat the argument. Eventually, the group of
145. This feature is what distinguishes the form-contract setting from other market settings
in which some expenditure on information is rational. For instance, in financial markets there is
ordinarily no actor in an analogous position to the contract drafter here who can set the terms of
trade to expropriate the costs expended in market research. There are competitive market situations, however, in which similar phenomena can arise. See, e.g., Diamond, A Model of Price
Adjustment, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 156-68 (1971).
146. See Katz, supra note 115. That paper also examines a variety of other issues not considered here, including the effects of applying other legal rules to the interpretation of form contracts, and the relative social efficiency of such differing rules.
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informed buyers dwindles to zero and the proposed equilibrium
unravels.
Put another way: the most discriminating buyer cannot find reading to be an equilibrium strategy, since if sellers are maximizing she is
sure to discover ex post a quality term that at best equals her reservation level. Hence, the set of informed buyers cannot include a most
discriminating member. But the only way this can occur is if the set is
empty - that is, if no buyer reads.
The only circumstance in which the group of informed buyers
would not unravel is where a nontrivial proportion of buyers faced no
positive cost in becoming informed. Such buyers would still read even
if quality were reduced to their reservation level, and sellers might
then be induced to provide quality sufficient to get them to
purchase. 147 It seems unlikely that the size of this group would be
empirically significant, however, and even if it were, such buyers are
likely to be particularly unrepresentative of the population of buyers as
a whole. Individual buyers whose costs of reading form contracts are
zero or negative may well be unusually able to protect themselves
against one-sided terms generally; hence the terms they would demand
may not be optimal for the larger population.
D.

Comments on the Model

A caveat to the foregoing analysis is in order: the argument made
above regarding product quality does not apply to all nonprice attributes of exchange; it only applies to those nonprice attributes that are
costly for all sellers to provide. This is what makes the buyers' and
sellers' interests strictly adverse, so that all sellers prefer to choose
minimal quality when buyers are uninformed. For some contract attributes, however, such as the timing of delivery or provisions for commercial arbitration, the interests of at least some buyers and sellers
may not be opposed. In this case sellers could differ in the latent terms
they prefer, and it could pay buyers to read form contracts to see
which of these sellers they were dealing with. But for terms such as
warranties, it is plausible to assume that increases in quality always
increase the seller's cost. As a result, unless the buyers are specifically
informed otherwise, they will find it rational to assume the worst
about any latent terms rather than to read. 14 8
147. Even this is not assured. If the group of informed buyers is small relative to the popula·
tion of uninformed buyers, sellers might be willing to sacrifice all sales to informed buyers in
order to obtain the cost savings from debasing quality for everyone else.
148. It is also essential that the quality term be continuously adjustable, or at least approximately so, else it will not necessarily be the case that the seller wishes to set it no higher than the
reservation level of the most discriminating buyer. Continuity is a plausible assumption for con-

November 1990]

Game Theory and Contract Formation

291

In addition, the outcome of the formal model is the same under the
duty to read as it would be under a legal rule that unposed a duty to
speak on the seller and also implied minimal quality from the seller's
silence. Under such a regime, buyers would not be willing to pay more
than V<> their valuation for a good of minimal quality, in response to a
form offer. Similarly, sellers who found it worth their while to make
the quality terms patent would have the incentive to provide optimal
quality. Further, only those sellers with sufficiently low marketing
costs would want to do this; the others would find it more profitable to
remain silent and earn the profits to be earned from selling low-quality
goods.
In actual practice, the seller's silence is often held to imply terms
other than those systematically most favorable to the seller, as illustrated, for example, by the implied warranty of merchantability for the
sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code. In this circumstance, the seller will go to the trouble of contracting around the implied quality terms if and only if the costs of doing so are less than the
increased exchange surplus so obtained. Still, the identical result
could be obtained under a duty to read regime that achieved the same
default terms through separate doctrinal constraints - such as a rule
that selling unmerchantable goods was presumptively unconscionable.
It follows from the formal analysis that the practical differences·
between a rule that implies a duty to read and a rule that implies a
duty to speak may be less than legal commentators have commonly
supposed. In particular, the aspects of the law that matter primarily
for the equilibrium outcome are the level of latent contract terms legally implied from the seller's silence under a duty to speak, and the
minimum level of latent terms tolerated under a duty to read. It may
not matter much which party formally bears the risk that the seller's
terms are not communicated to the buyer, since any communication
about them must effectively take place through the seller's efforts.
When contract terms are latent or otherwise costly for the recipient to determine, courts or regulatory authorities might be able to improve the efficiency of private bargaining by providing implied
warranties, by refusing to give effect to at least some fine-print terms,
and by construing instruments against the drafter. This will be the
case if. the terms implied are more efficient than are those one-sided
tract attributes such as warranties or liquidated damages, but other provisions may be available
only in discrete alternatives. For example, many actual form-contract disputes arise out of
clauses that require disputes between the parties to be settled by commercial arbitration rather
than by the courts. Ambiguous contract language regarding which alternative is to apply, however, may make even those provisions effectively continuous.
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terms that would be chosen by an opportunistic drafter. Whether or
not courts are capable of actually implementing this is impossible to
tell a priori, but requires empirical investigation. It should be stressed,
however, that the test for whether implied warranties can improve the
efficiency of bargaining is not whether the cost of reading is less than
the cost of speaking. Such a comparison is misplaced, since under the
conditions I have discussed reading is not an effective substitute for
speaking. The appropriate test, rather, is whether the cost of reading
is nontrivial for most recipients.149
I believe that the reason that Baird and Weisberg missed the preceding line of analysis is that their informal and heuristic argument
did not precisely specify the sequential structure of bargaining. As a
consequence, they overlooked the fact that the decision to spend resources becoming informed must precede the information that reveals
whether it is worth doing so, and that the drafters of form contracts
have the incentive to take advantage of this. But it is just this fact that
makes reading irrational. If the cost of reading form contracts could
be recovered after the fact, the Baird and Weisberg analysis would be
correct. In practice, those costs generally are sunk, and hence vulnerable to appropriation ex post by an enterprising seller who recognizes
this ex ante.
I do not mean to criticize Baird and Weisberg too harshly, nor do I
think that the model presented here is the last word on form-contract
bargaining. In my opinion, they identified the correct economic issue
- whether giving offerors control over the terms of the contract does
a better job of minimizing transaction costs than does a centralized
presumptive standard - and I am more in sympathy with their approach than with that of commentators such as Rakoff and Slawson
who focus exclusively on considerations of equity and consent in their
criticism of legal doctrine. This is so even though my ultimate policy
conclusions are probably closer to that of the latter authors. 150
My main point, instead, is to emphasize the risk of using intuition
and informal heuristics to make predictions about bargaining in com149. Compare Posner's suggestion that the test for enforcing fine-print clauses be "whether
the wording, placement, or format of the clause is such as to impose excessive search costs on
prospective customers." R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 85-86 (2d ed. 1977).
150. Both Rakoffand Slawson, supra note 116, as well as other critics of standardized form
contracts, might well argue that my approach attributes too much rationality to potential buyers
and sellers, and that the dominant practical objection to such forms arises from parties' incompetence in dealing with them. I am certainly prepared to accept irrationality in bargaining as a
significant empirical phenomenon, especially in the consumer setting, although I would like to
see some more attempts actually to measure the extent of its importance. It ought to be recognized, however, that it is not necessary to rely on such factors in order to justify the policies they
recommend.
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plicated settings, since the precise information available to the parties
and the sequence of decisions can matter greatly to the result. Only
after intensive study of particular institutional facts will we acquire
theories of bargaining that can reliably predict, and the process will
inevitably be an incremental one. Formal analysis of the sort illustrated here will be a necessary tool if we are to know just which institutional facts are relevant to our purposes.
CONCLUSION

This article has ranged more or less freely over a number of related
topics in contract law, in the economic analysis of law, and in applied
game theory. It is intended as speculative and as an argument for the
style of analysis of which it is an example. The basic contours of its
thesis, nonetheless, can be summarily stated: The lack of an adequate
theory of bargaining presents a central and fundamental problem for
the economic analysis of law. In spite of this, law-and-economics
scholars have devoted relatively little attention to analyzing the contract doctrines that determine the institutional framework within
which negotiation takes place. Instead, they have focused their consideration on the more substantive aspects of contract law at the expense of its procedural aspects. This omission on the part of these
scholars has its counterpart in the failure of more traditional commentators to examine the policy consequences of the technical rules governing contract formation with anywhere near the thoroughness with
which they have explored the incentive properties of, for example, remedial doctrines.
I argue, in contrast, that the consequences of even the most formalistic rules of contract formation and interpretation can be analyzed
fruitfully by viewing bargaining as a noncooperative game, in which
parties attempt to maximize their returns from negotiation given the
relevant institutional constraints and the likely behavior of the other
participants. Such an analysis requires substantial judgment and common sense for its successful execution, because of the wide variety of
factors that determine the strategic structure of the bargaining. Once
the techniques and styles of thought necessary for the effort are
learned, however, they can be used to analyze both straightforward
doctrines, which may superficially appear to serve primarily conventional functions, as well as more complicated rules that are agreed to
have important consequences for efficiency and fairness of bargaining
- even if it is unclear from an initial perspective just what those consequences might be.
The specific models of contract bargaining presented here are in-
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tended more to illustrate the potential of the game-theoretic approach
than. to establish any strong conclusions regarding the economic efficiency of the particular doctrines considered there. Nonetheless, the
particular models do yield specific conclusions, if we are reasonably
restrained in our ambitions.
Using the model of Part V, which considered the consequences of
treating silence in the face of an offer as an acceptance, we might construct plausible arguments either for or against the hypothesis that the
prevailing doctrinal rules embodied in the Second Restatement are justified on grounds of efficiency. When bargaining takes the form of a
single take-it-or-leave-it offer, as it sometimes does in practice, treating
silence as acceptance increases the efficiency of negotiation when the
cost of a response is small. Arguably, this corresponds to distinctions
made in black-letter law. On the other hand, the efficiency criterion
might justify extending the scope for silent acceptance substantially
beyond the limits allowed by current doctrine. If this is the case, the
traditional rules might be better explained by a judicial concern for the
distributional aspects of exchange, as well as a distaste for the potential opportunism inherent under alternative regimes.
The relative simplicity of the take-it-or-leave-it model was argua·
bly a virtue when the model was applied to the situation of a silent
acceptance. The resulting insights seemed roughly to correspond to
the kinds of justifications, however cursory and conclusory, that traditionally have been offered for prevailing doctrines, even if the conventional wisdom was not borne out in all respects. The model of Part
VI, in contrast, which analyzed the duty to read in the form-contract
context, suggests that when information is imperfect, heuristic or intuitive modes of thought can yield results more misleading than helpful.
Formal analysis may be required to identify the sensitivity of the
model to variations in its assumptions.
For example, I argued that under a strict duty to read, notwithstanding some superficially plausible arguments to the contrary, recipients of form contracts would generally lack incentive to acquaint
themselves with the latent terms contained within, and that as a result
those terms would be chosen suboptimally. It follows from such an
analysis that the efficiency of bargaining might be enhanced by legal
rules that limit the power of drafting parties to vary contract terms
without explicitly notifying the recipient. This line of argument was
made possible only by precisely specifying the strategic sequence of the
bargaining. Accordingly, an important lesson of the analysis is that
the predictions of any theoretical account of bargaining cannot be reli-
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ably trusted until the robustness of the theory to cb.ariges in its specifications has been studied.
·
·
·
··
With regard to the particular doctrines I have considered, my conclusions must be viewed as incomplete at best. Still, a number of
broadly general observations are possible. To begin with, the legal
rules of contract formation and interpretation have substantive consequences; they can and probably do affect parties' incentives and hence
the efficiency and outcome of actual negotiation. Furthermore, the
rules' substantive effects go beyond the mere provision of convention
and coordination. As the models of both Parts V and VI demonstrated, different rules can lead to different bargains being struck. On
the other hand, apparently antagonistic rules, such as those imposing a
duty to read form contracts versus a duty to disclose their contents,
can have similar allocative effects depending on other aspects of the
strategic structure. The similarity, however, need not grow out of a
Coasian model of bargaining or out of any assumption of zero transaction costs.
The research program I propose is just getting started. Its implications are not yet at the stage that can be practically applied, except at
the most general level. Judges and legislators can, however, at least
learn to be cautious about basing their decisions. about contract formation and interpretation on facile predictions about the likely course of
negotiation, and scholars can be more careful about encouraging them
to do so. Private individuals with better knowledge of their particular
strategic positions may be able to go further than this, and use the
insights of bargaining theory to help design the frameworks in which
they choose to contract.
I have argued that traditional explanations of offer and acceptance
doctrine, and of contract formation doctrine generally, fail to identify
important incentive effects. The methods and styles of thought of noncooperative game theory, on the other hand, highlight such effects;
they help to illuminate the policy consequences of the law of bargaining by drawing our attention to its strategic structure. The potential
insights to be gained transcend the narrow concerns of contract lawyers and scholars. Since Coase's classic article and probably· before,
we have known that the opportunity for private individuals to enter
into contracts can critically influence the efficiency and fairness of substantive rules and regulations in every field of the faw. By devoting
more attention to the specific branch of law that governs the procedures of private ordering,· we may learn how better to use the law in
general to promote the public interest.

